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THE scope of duty in negligence cases ' is coming increasingly to be mea-
sured by the famous formulation:
"Whenever one person is placed by circumstances in such a posi-
tion in regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did
think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care
and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances,
he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the
other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
danger."
2
One of the situations in which the application of this test has been con-
ventionally denied, however, is where plaintiff has voluntarily placed himself
within reach of the effects of defendant's failure to take precautions3 The
chief example of such a situation is the case where plaintiff voluntarily comes
upon land occupied by defendant, and is injured there by a dangerous con-
dition of the premises or by some activity of the occupier.4
The judicial approach to this problem, formulated during the course of the
19th century and still providing the point of departure for modern reason-
ing, divides persons entering land into classes, and graduates accordingly the
duties owed by the land occupier.5 Under the conventional approach, the
three classes of entrants onto land are trespassers, licensees, and invitees.
Those who enter land without the occupier's permission or any other right
to do so, are trespassers. To them, the occupier owes no duty with reference
to the condition of the premises, save this: he must refrain from intentionally
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arranging the premises, e.g., setting spring guns, so as to constitute a trap
for the trespasser. As to his activities on his land, the occupier may general-
iy pursue them without reference to the possible presence of trespassers,
though he may not intentionally injure a trespasser.0 Licensees--gratuitous,"
"bare," or "mere"-enter land with the occupier's permission but only for
their own purposes which are not connected with the occupier's interests.
To them the occupier owes a duty to warn of concealed dangers of the
premises which he actually knew about, and a duty to refrain from unreason-
ably dangerous active conduct-which would generally mean to take reason-
able precautions in carrying on activities which might be injurious to licen-
sees.7 There is some dispute as to the essence of what makes a man an
invitee. Some believe it lies in conduct by the occupier, e.g., an arrangement
of -the premises, which would encourage people to enter the land with a sense
of assurance that it had been prepared for their safety.8 Others find a need
for the visit to serve the business interest and pecuniary gain of the occupier.0
Whatever the test of an invitee, the occupier owes him the affirmative duty
of care to discover conditions of the premises that may be unreasonably dan-
gerous for the invitee, and either to remedy the defect or acquaint the invitee
with the danger.10 The occupier also must refrain from conduct which is fore-
seeably and unreasonably dangerous to his invitee.1 ' Throughout the judi-
cial consideration of these duties to trespassers, licensees, and invitees, the
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is recurrently drawn, and a
duty of care is more readily found where defendant's conduct is viewed as
involving dangerous activity than where it is looked upon as a mere failure
to take affirmative steps for plaintiff's protection."-
6. 38 Am. Jun., Negligence §§ 109-115 (1941) ; 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 24 (1950). See
also authorities cited note 4 supra, and pp. 174-82 infra. The statements made at this
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10. 38 Am. Jun, Negligence § 96 (1941) ; 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 45 (1950). See
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From this thumbnail sketch of the graduated duties conventionally said to
be owed by an occupier of land, it may be seen that to no entrant would the
occupier owe the full duty of using reasonable care under all the circum-
stances. To the trespasser no duty of care would be owed at all, but only an
obligation to refrain from more grievous types of wrong. To the licensee no
duty of care would be owed to discover dangers that lurk in the premises.
Even to the favored invitee the occupier would fully discharge his duty if he
pointed out a dangerous defect, instead of using care to remedy the condi-
tions. Thus, a man could say to his milkman: "Here is my path, icy and
slippery and dangerous. I have no intention of scraping or sanding it. If
you want to deal with me, take it as it is; if you don't, I'll take my custom
elsewhere."
As we shall see in examining these situations in greater detail, various
justifications have been advanced for different aspects of the rules. But the
consensus of modern opinion is that the special privilege these rules accord
to the occupation of land sprang from the high place which land has tradi-
tionally held in English and American thought and the still continuing domin-
ance and prestige of the landowning class in England during the formative
period of this development.13 This sanctity of land ownership included notions
of its economic importance and the social desirability of the free use and ex-
ploitation of land. Probably it also included, especially in England, more
intangible overtones bound up with the values of a social system that traced
much of its heritage to feudalism.
It would be surprising, however, if the general trend over the last one
hundred years towards wider accident liability had left the land occupier's
citadel untouched. It has not. The tendency of the law, here as elsewhere,
has been towards an ever fuller application of the requirement of reasonable
care under all the circumstances, and this tendency has included something
of the leavening which has taken place generally within the negligence prin-
ciple itself so as to make it approach a system of liability without fault.1 4
Of course, this process is not complete-and may indeed never be com-
pleted. But it marks contemporary developments, which we shall now pro-
ceed to examine. The present article will treat the duty to trespassers; a
forthcoming article will deal with that owed to licensees and invitees.
Throughout both articles will run an inquiry into the validity of these classi-
fications and the system of liability based on them.
THOSE PROTECTED BY THE RESTRIcTivE RULES AS TO DUTY
Primarily it is the one in possession of real estate-the occupier-who is
protected by the special rules of immunity. The occupier may be, and very
13. See, e.g., Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 6 (1840) ; Humphrey v. Twin State
Gas & Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 418, 139 Atl. 440, 442 (1927). See also BonLEn, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 46; ELDEEDGE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 164.
14. The development is traced in EHRENZwEIG, NEGLIG;ENc WITHOUT FAULT (1951).
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often is, the owner; but he need not be. If the property is leased, for instance,
the tenant is in possession and the owner may indeed be a trespasser during
the term of the lease.15 Again, the adverse possessor of premises may have
the benefit of these special rules as against those whom the law regards as
trespassers, licensees, or initees, as to him.1 Moreover, the occupier's im-
munities probably inure to members of his family 17 and also to those acting
in his behalf on the premises either as employees 18 or as independent con-
tractors.19
A question has arisen whether a licensee, an invitee,2 3 or the holder of an
easement on the land of another may invoke the occupier's immunities as
against other entrants onto that land, e.g., trespassers or bare licensees. If
the source of that immunity is the unlikelihood of the trespasser's presence,
so that the possessor, in using his property, "is not chargeable with that rea-
sonable anticipation of harm to others which in such a case as this is the basis
of liability in negligence," 2 1 then it is reasonable enough to apply the same
rule in favor of the licensee, invitee, or holder of an easement. The plaintiff's
presence, or injury to him, is generally no more foreseeable to such a defen-
dant than it would be to the occupier himself. But this, as we shall see, is
an unsatisfactory reason for the immunity of the occupier; it would be even
less satisfactory as a basis for immunity of others. And if immunity originated
in an overzealous desire to safeguard the right of ownership as it was regarded
15. Dickinson v. Goodspeed, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 119 (1851). The Dickinson case was
cited with approval in Wurm v. Allen Cadillac Co., 301 Mass. 413, 413, 17 N.E2d 305,
308 (1938) (lessee not held liable since "the owner himself had no right to enter and
could not lawfully authorize the plaintiff to do so").
16. RESTAT=E INT, TORTS § 329, comments a and c (1934). But cf. note 23 i,:fra.
17. RsT.tTImIENT, TORTS § 382 (1934).
18- Id. §§ 383-7.
19. Id. § 384. Cole v. Willcutt & Sons Co., 214 Mass. 453, 101 N.E. 995 (1913);
Blackstone v. Chelmsford F. Co., 170 Aass. 321, 49 N.E. 635 (1898). See Belliveau V.
New York Cent. R.R., 321 Mass. 728, 75 N.E.2d 645 (1947) (railroad has same im-
munities as owners of tracks over which it has right to run) ; Gravelle v. New York, N.H.
& H.R.R., 282 Mass. 262, 134 N.E. 717 (1933) (same); Hafey v. Turners Falls Power &
Electric Co., 240 Mass. 155, 133 N.E. 107 (1921) (electric company treated the same as
the owner of the property over which were strung the wires which caused the accident).
But cf. Sarna v. American Bosch Magneto Co., 290 Mass. 340, 195 N.E. 328 (1935),
discussed in note 20 infra.
20. See Mludrich v. Standard Oil Co., 153 Ohio St. 31, 90 N.E.2d 859 (1950) (ques-
tion reserved with regard to invitees; however, the treatment of the facts suggests that
invitees do not share the special protection accorded occupiers at least where active neg-
ligence is concerned).
In Sarna v. American Bosch Magneto Co., supra note 19, defendant (which dumped
dangerous substance on another's land) was held not to share the owner's immunities
towards a licensee on the land, whether defendant was invitee or merely licensee of owner.
The court distinguished other Massachusetts cases, supra note 19, where the owner had
"invested the defendant with possession of some part of his land," or had let him put some
structure there.
21. 'McPheters v. Loomis, 125 Conn. 526, 532, 7 A.2d 437, 441 (1939).
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under a system of landed estates,2 2 then there seems to be no reason for ex-
tending special tenderness beyond the scope required by precedent, or for
enlarging the class of defendants exempted from the duty generally owed by
all men to use reasonable care towards everyone likely to be hurt by their
carelessness. 23 The point is one on which the cases go both ways.2 4 Some
thirty years ago they were "quite evenly divided upon it," but later cases in-
cline the weight of authority towards holding the non-occupier to the duty
of reasonable care.
2 5
CONDITION OF THE PREMISES
To those who come on to land without the occupier's permission, or some
other right to do so, the occupier still owes a very limited duty with respect
22. See Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 418, 139 Atl. 440,
442 (1927).
23. This reasoning might also apply to adverse possessors prior to the ripening of
possession into title. But cf. note 16 supra and accompanying text.
On the other hand, it has been urged that to deny business invitees the immunity of
the occupier would limit the occupier's beneficial use of the property, since the presence
of business invitees (which is of benefit to the occupier) would thereby be burdened arnd
discouraged. Note, 21 MINN. L. RmV. 338 (1936). It might also be argued that the valid
core of policy behind the immunity, i.e., the encouragement of beneficial exploitation of
land, applies to all who are engaged in such beneficial exploitations. This would include
many invitees and easement-holders, as well as occupiers.
However, whether these burdens would, in fact, inhibit useful enterprise is very doubt-
ful. See James & Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARV. L. REv.
769, 781 (1950).
24. Note, 14 A.L.R. 1023, 1035 (1921). Compare Guinn v. Delaware & A. Tel. Co.,
72 N.J.L. 276, 62 Atl. 412 (1905) (telephone company owed duty of due care to tres-
passer), with Robbins v. Minute Tapioca Co., 236 Mass. 387, 128 N.E. 417 (1920) (elec-
tric company owed duty only to refrain from wanton and wilful conduct towards tres-
passers).
25. See cases cited Note, 56 A.L.R. 1021, 1030 (1928). Later cases which deny the
immunity are: Langazo v. San Joaquin L. & P. Corp., 32 Cal. App. 2d 678, 689, 90 P.2d
825, 831 (1939) ; Wise v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co., 109 Ind. App. 681, 691,
34 N.E.2d 975, 979 (1941); Sarna v. American Bosch Magneto Co., 290 Mass, 340, 195
N.E. 328 (1935) (discussed note 20 supra) ; Baker Utilities Co. v. Haney, 203 Okla. 91,
93, 218 P.2d 621, 623-4 (1950). See also PRossna, ToRTs 612-13 (1941); 18 AM. JuiL,
Electricity § 67 (1938) ; 29 C.J.S., Electricity § 43 (1941).
But cf. Petrak v. Cooke Contracting Co., 329 Mich. 564, 568, 46 N.W.2d 574, 576
(1951). This case also suggests the possibility of distinguishing the above cases on the
ground that they involve an inherently dangerous instrumentality (electricity). However,
the language in the cases is broad enough to support the general statements appearing
in the text. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 418, 139
AtI. 440, 442 (1927) ("The object of the law being to safeguard and protect the various
rights in land, it is obviously going quite far enough to limit the immunity to the one
whose rights have been invaded .... A trespass is an injury to possession; and as it is
only he whose possession is disturbed who can sue therefore, so it should be that he,
alone, could assert the unlawful invasion when suit is brought by an injured trespasser.") ;
Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, 267 Pa. 564, 109 Atl. 653 (1920) (same notion applied where
danger on defendant's land jeopardized trespassers on his neighbor's land).
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to conditions of the premises. If the dangerous condition is a natural one,
any such duty would involve the kind of affirmative obligation that the la,
has traditionally been reluctant to impose.20 It is not surprising then that the
possessor of land generally owes a trespasser no duty to discover, remedy,
or warn of dangerous natural conditions.27 Perhaps if the possessor sees a
trespasser about to encounter extreme danger from such a source, which is
known to the possessor and perceptibly not known to the trespasser, there
may be a duty of care to warn 28 (as by shouting). That is about as far as
the bystander's duty to a highway traveler would go, if indeed it would go
that far.29 It could hardly be expected that the law would push this doubt-
ful area of liability further in favor of a trespasser, unless perhaps it came to
regard the mere passive ownership of land as an enterprise (because of its
potential benefit, its insurability, 30 and so on), and this kind of risk as one
the enterprise should bear. This seems unlikely.
According to the traditional statement, the possessor's duties toward tres-
passers were just about as limited when the danger came from a structure or
other artificial condition on the land.31 In general there Nwas no duty to dis-
26. See BOHL ., op. cit. supra note 3, at 33 ct secq.; James, supra note 1, at ,00-09;
McNiece & Thornton, Alirnzath' Di is in Tort, 53 Y.TZ LJ. 1272 (1949).
27. Eldredge, Tort L1"a1ility to Trespassers, 12 Tmip. L.Q. 32 (1937), reprinted in
EL EDGE, MonDn. TORT PRamIs 163, 187 (1941). Actual decisions to this effect are at
least scarce, but the proposition is conceded by all hands. See, e.g., Peters v. Bowman,
115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113, (1896) (pond backed on defendant's land by embankment made
by city, and "considered as a natural pond" as to defendant) ; Bagby v. Kansas City, 333
Mo. 771, 92 S.W.2d 142 (1936) (loose rock in cliff in part of park not intended for wall:
or playground).
"Where artificial conditions more or less duplicate natural conditions, some courts
similarly deny a duty of care. Anderson v. Reith-Riley Construction Co., 112 Ind. App.
170, 44 N.E.2d 184 (1942) (artificial cliff which merely duplicated a natural cliff) ; Plot-
zd v. Standard Oil Co., 228 Ind. 518, 92 N.E.2d 632 (1950) (artificial pond which
merely duplicated a natural pond); Zagar v. Union Pacific ILR., 113 Kan. 240, 214
Pac. 107 (1923) (artificial bluff which merely duplicated a natural bluff) ; Arnold v. St.
Louis, 152 Mo. 173, 53 S.W. 900 (1899) (pond backed onto city street-child skating
thereon drown-ed when ice broke); Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Powers, 206 Okla. 322, 243
P.2d 633 (1952) (general holding on artificial and natural ponds). See p. 165 in ,ra.
23. RE5T.ATE-IumT, ToRrs § 337 cazcat (1934). Cf. ELDER-GE MoDazr- Toar Pnor-
LEs 187 (1941).
29. James, supra note 1, at S03. See also Note, 52 Co. L. Rnv. 631 (1952).
30. Ehrenzweig, Assurance Oblige-A Comparative Study, 15 LAtw & Co:rn:n.
PRoB 445 (1950).
31. See Melendez v. Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 63 P.2d 971 (1937); McPheters v.
Loomis, 125 Conn. 526, 7 A.2d 437 (1939) ; Boyer v. Guidicy Marble, Terrazzo & Tile
Co., 246 S.W.2d 742 (Mo. 1952) ; Ehret v. Scarsdale, 269 N.Y. 193, 199 N.E_. E6 (1935) ;
Previte v. Wanskunk Co., - P.L -, 90 A.2d 769 (1952) ; Southern v. Cowan Stone Co.,
183 Tenn. 576, 221 S.W.2d S09 (1949). See also H. uE, Tom § 90 (1933) (no distinc-
tion made between artificial and natural conditions) ; Pnossmr, Torms § 77 (1941) (same) ;
38 Am Jun., Negligence § 109 (1941) (same) ; 65 C.J.S., Negligence §24c (1950) (same) ;
REsTXIEET, Tozrs § 333 (1934) (same).
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cover, remedy, or warn of such a danger. Conditions that were pregnant with
likelihood of harm and would reek with negligence if such a duty were owed,
might be left with impunity as far as trespassers were concerned. 2 This
result is not so readily accounted for by the distinction between misfeasance
and nonfeasance, although condition of premises cases are often assimilated
to passive negligence or nonfeasance.33 Here the possessor has engaged in
activity by artificially arranging the land for his own purposes. Why does
he not, therefore, come under the duty of care to take reasonable precautions
to prevent these arrangements from causing foreseeable and unreasonable risk
of harm to trespassers? Why is he not subject to the ordinary duty to refrain
from negligence? Several reasons have been urged.
It is often said that people are not likely to trespass, so that the possessor
of land may disregard their possible presence.3 4 This may be recognized as
a variant of the oft-recurring notion that a man may assume lawful conduct
on the part of others and need not anticipate wrongdoing.36 If this were put
forth as a broad generalization of fact to support a rebuttable presumption,
it would fit well enough into the framework of negilgence. If the duty of care
is created and measured by the probability of harm, then the fact that no one
is likely to be within the range of defendant's conduct means that he need
not do it carefully, whether he is in the desert, on his own land, or even on a
lonely stretch of road.3 6 But a trespasser's presence is often foreseeable in fact,
32. See, e.g., Richardson v. Whittier, 265 Mass. 478, 164 N.E. 384 (1929) (directed
verdict for defendant who had left open the guarding gate of an elevator well 26 inches
from sidewalk; court declared that plaintiff was unprotected by relevant department of
public safety elevator regulations since he was a trespasser); Dehanitz v. St. Paul, 73
Minn. 385, 76 N.W. 48 (1898) (unfenced slough near highway, used for dumping ground,
and covered over by thin crust on which weeds had grown; ten-year old child cutting
across lots broke through and drowned; held, demurrer to complaint should have been
sustained) ; Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 At1. 858 (1911) (unguarded open-
ing into underground mill race near highway and playground).
33. This was the approach Bohlen took. BOHLEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 33 et seq.
But cf. id. at 182-3. See also authorities cited notes 27 and 31 supra.
34. See Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 110, 113, 193 Atl. 608, 609 (1937); Rahe v.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 318 Pa. 376, 378-80, 178 Atl. 467, 467-9 (1935). See also
BOHLEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 61; ELDREGE, op. cit. supra note 28, at 164; PaOSSEn,
TORTs 610 (1941).
35. For a general analysis of this notion see James, Nature of Negligence, 3 UTAH
L. REV. 275, 291-2 (1953).
36. See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850) ; Fitzpatrick v. Pen.
field, 267 Pa. 564, 574-6, 109 Atl. 653, 657 (1920).
The nature of the locality, as it affects the probability of harm, may also affect the
question of whether strict liability is to be imposed. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Davidson Con-
struction Co., 110 Kan. 298, 203 Pac. 1113 (1922) (whether operation of rock crusher was a
nuisance) ; Heeg v. Licht, 80 N.Y. 579, 36 Am. Rep. 654 (1880) (applicability of strict
liability for storing of explosives) ; Kendall v. Johnson, 51 Wash. 477, 99 Pac. 310 (1909)
(whether blasting by contractor "in the Cascade Mountains far removed from any human
habitation" involved such inherent danger that contractor's employer would be vicarious-
ly liable for it).
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and when that is so, the occupier should not be exempted from the obliga-
tion of ordinary care by a rule of law founded on a premise of fact shown
not to exist in this case.
37
It is also urged that the duty of care towards trespassers would impose
an unreasonable burden on the use of land.38 This contention has several
aspects. In the first place the duty not to be negligent is only a duty to take
reasonable precautions against undue risk of harm. Even if the possessor
were to come under the ordinary rule of negligence, therefore, he could always
repel the obligation to take any precautions he could show to be unreason-
ably burdensome. The law of negligence is itself an accommodation to the
social need for dangerous enterprise and activity. This at least is the theory.33
Yet it may be urged with some reason that however careful a defendant has
been, in nearly every case the ingenuity of counsel after the event can sug-
gest some further or alternative precaution that might have avoided injury ; O
and, since juries are ever ready to find a defendant negligent 4 1 this would
in practice burden occupiers of land with an infinite series of precautions, or
in effect make them insurers against injury caused by the dangerous con-
ditions of their land.4s Something approaching this perhaps obtains broadly
in the accident field. The question here is whether or not the use of land
ought to be exempted from the treatment accorded to enterprises generally. 3
It is submitted that the only reasons for doing so are: (1) the sanctity once
attributed to land ownership and the elevation of this value over the lives and
limbs of trespassers, particularly in England; and (2) the fact that there are
37. Under the traditional rule, "A landowner may in fact reasonably anticipate an
invasion of his property, but in law he is entitled to assume that he will not be interfered
with." Guinn v. Delaware & A. Tel. Co., 72 N.J.L. 276, 278, 62 At. 412, 413 (1905).
See Fitzpatrick v. Penfield, supra note 36, wherein the presence of child trespassers
on ad~ioining land was thought likely enough to afford the basis of a landowner's lia-
bility, although the court thought that the owner of the premises trespassed upon w6uld
not be liable.
38. See, e.g., Bagby v. Kansas City, 338 Mo. 771, 77940, 92 S.WV2d 142, 147 (1936);
Delaware, Lackawana & W.R.R. v. Reich, 61 N.J.L. 635, 40 At. 682 (1893) ; Bottum's
Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 Ad. 858 (1911). Also see Smith, Liability of Landozcwrs
to Children Enteri;g Without Permission, 11 HAhv. L. RP. 349, 362 (1893) ("To my
... that B must keep his land in safe condition to be trespassed upon ... might in effect
amount to a confiscation of his land for the benefit of trespassers.").
39. James, Nature of Negligence, 3 UTAH L. REv. 275, 279-S6 (1953).
40. See Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entern, I'ithout Pern:issia:-
IH, 11 HAv. L. REv. 434, 435-9 (1898).
41. See CLrm AND SHuLrAN,, A STUDY OF LAw ADMWuSTRATIONT I: Co:N-IcnCu
30 (1937); James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 538 Y E LJ. C57,
687, (1948).
42. Smith, supra note 40, at 435.
43. In an interesting discussion of this trend, Ehrenzweig suggests that an enterprise
compensate for injuries that might have been foreseen as typical casualties of such enter-
prise, and that this test should supplant the one which bases liability on foreseeability of
harm from specific acts. Ehrenzweig, supra note 30.
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many small homeowners in this country. The first reason is not a good one,
though it may well be the actual one.44 As to the second, it may be said that
the bulk of these accidents involve industrial or business property, and that
the slight risk of the small landowner is readily and reasonably insurable.
4
Another reason advanced for the immunities of land occupiers is that the
trespasser is a wrongdoer.40 Sometimes this is put in the form of contributory
negligence;47 and a trespass under the circumstances of a given case may
amount to contributory negligence, as where a man walks along a single
track railroad trestle. Where this is the case, his contributory negligence 48
would be a factor to consider under the ordinary rules of negligence quite
aside from the trespass. But the trespass is often given an effect over and
above that accorded to contributory negligence. 49 Moreover, trespassing is
not always or even usually negligent. The wrong it entails is the invasion of
a property interest, not the subjection of oneself to unreasonable risk of
harm.50 All in all, this aspect of trespass could not account for the traditional
44. See sources cited note 13 szpra.
45. Any one who opposes the current trends in accident law generally will, of
course, regard the land occupier's immunities with kindly eye.
46. See, e.g., Salt River Valley Ass'n v. Compton, 40 Ariz. 282, 285, 11 P.2d 839,
840 (1932) ("It would be intolerable that one who would not have been injured save for
his own unlawful act may penalize another."). See also Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers,
23 HARV. L. REv. 403, 406 (1914) ("The [reason] most frequently advanced is that the
plaintiff cannot by his own wrong impose a duty toward him upon the innocent land-
owner."). A recent statement of this point of view may be found in Note, 31 TFx. L, RaV.
80 (1952).
47. See, e.g., McAllister v. Jung, 112 Ill. App. 138, 147 (1904) ("Such persons are
not merely contributors to any injury they may there sustain, but active in inflicting the
injuries upon themselves. . . ."). See also PnossER, Toars 611 (1941).
48. See James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953).
49. Thus courts have denied recovery to trespassing children too young to be negli-
gent. See Santora v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 211 Mass. 464, 98 N.E. 90 (1912) (child
27 rhonths old) ; Moore v. Penn. R.R., 99 Pa. 301, 305 (1882) ("The circumstance that
the trespasser was a boy . . . cannot affect the application of the rule" [of nonliability to
trespassers].).
50. And even in this respect, the "wrong" to property may be an innocent one. Yet,
"[a] plaintiff cannot avoid the rule governing trespassers and bare licensees by showing
that he was carried upon the property by accident or against his will. The question is
primarily one of duty on the defendant's part rather than innocence on the plaintiff's."
Trudo v. Lazarus, 116 Vt. 221, 224, 73 A.2d 306, 308 (1950). On the other hand, where
the danger is near a highway and plaintiff a highway traveler, his trespass is treated as
only "technical" and is overlooked; this may represent an unconscious recognition of
the distinction between the kinds of wrong suggested in the text. E.g., Downes v. Silva,
57 R.I. 343, 190 At. 42 (1937). See sources cited note 86 infra. Although the courts'
handling of such cases may be rationalized on the de iniinis principle, the traditional
rigidity of the property concept of trespass suggests that the courts may be applying a
qualitative distinction (i.e., one concerned with whether the kind of wrong has relevance
under the negligence concept as opposed to the property concept) rather than a quantita-
tive (i.e., one concerned with the size of the trespass) one in such cases. See, e.g., Gera-
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rule. If his wrong puts the trespasser beyond the pale of a duty of ordinary
care, this is because he is treated as something of an outlaw who is not en-
titled to the benefit of rules requiring humane consideration for people
generally.5' Perhaps landed gentry did once so regard the poacher in Eng-
land.5 2 A trace of it may still linger in the more emotional aspects of the
notion that the useful exploitation of land should not be interfered with. But
such an attitude finds little modem acceptance in our lawP It seems especially
inappropriate here in view of the relatively innocent character of many tres-
passes.
The trespasser's assumption of risk has also been urged as a reason for
the possessor's immunities,5 4 but this is rather one way of describing the rule
than of accounting for it.;5 There is no express and often no conscious or
voluntary assumption of any risk here. The trespass is usually voluntary,
but the risk is imposed by law on the trespasser no matter what his state of
mind, or even his capacity. There may be a general feeling that it shozld
be imposed on him, but if so, we are driven back to seek the reason for the
feeling. The only thing that "assumption of risk" adds to the discussion is a
possible reminder of the fact that mature, conscious trespassers ordinarily
do not expect premises to be prepared for their safety.
In sum then, the traditional rule confers on an occupier of land a special
privilege to be careless which is quite out of keeping with the development of
accident law generally and is no more justifiable here than it would be in
the case of any other useful enterprise or activity. As we have suggested,
this special privilege is receding; it remains here to trace the current develop-
ments of this recession.
gosian v. Union Realty Co., 2S9 Mass. 104, 193 N.E. 726 (1935) (rejecting quantitative
test in case involving invasion of property interest).
51. Cf. Rolli v. Converse, 227 Mass. 162, 164, 116 N.E. 507, 503 (1917) ("[A]n un-
registered [motor vehicle] is a trespasser ... and a person riding in an unregistered
machine has no rights against other travelers except to be protected from reckless or wil-
ful injury."). This outlaw-trespass-nuisance theory is apparently still the law in Massa-
chusetts. Dean v. Leonard, 323 Mass. 606, 83 N.E.2d 443 (1949). But see Note, 29
B.U.L. REv. 549 (1949). The disfavor with which it is regarded is evident in the unwill-
ingness of the courts to extend the doctrine. Rich Y. Finley, 325 Mass. 99, .'9 N.E2d 213
(1949), 30 B.U.L. REv. 266 (1950) (unregistered airplane neither a trespasser nor a
nuisance). See James, Statutory Standards and Negligence ill AcCident Cascs, 11 LA. L
REv. 95, 104 (1950).
52. See sources cited note 13 supra.
53. "This is a severe attitude. Whether we would now adopt it, if the matter were
new, is beside the point We are not disposed to extend its application." Dean v. Leonard,
supra note 51, at 609 (unregistered automobile). Thus the fact that defendant trespasses
on the land of a third party does not itself make him liable for injuries inflicted on plain-
tiff. Petrillo v. Kolbay, 116 Conn. 3S9, 394, 165 Ad. 346, 343 (1933).
54. See McPheters v. Loomis, 125 Conn. 526, 7 A2d 437 (1939).
55. See James, Assumption of Risk, 61 Ym LJ. 141 (1952) (general treatment of
relationship between assumption of risk and concept of duty).
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The possessor of land may not arrange his premises intentionally so as to
cause death or serious bodily harm to a trespasser.' The possessor may of
course take some steps to repel a trespass. If he is present he may use force
to do so, but only that amount which is reasonably necessary to effect the
repulse. 57 Moreover if the trespass threatens harm to property only-even
a theft of property-the possessor would not be privileged to use deadly force
even if there is no other way to prevent the trespass. 8 Where the owner
in person would not be privileged to use deadly force, he may not arrange
his premises so that such force will be inflicted by mechanical means,5 If
56. 38 Am. JUR., Negligence §§110, 114 (1941); 65 C.J.S., Negligence §§25-6
(1950) ; HARPER, TORTS § 88 (1933) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 77, pp. 613-15 (1941) ; RESTATE-
ME T, TORTS § 79 (1934); BOHLEN, op. cit. sutpra note 3, c. 2; Eldredge, Tort Liability
to Trespassers, 12 TEMP. L.Q. 32, 33 (1937) ; Smith, Liability of Landowncrs to Children
Entering Without Permission, 11 HARv. L. REv. 349, 350 (1898).
57. See, e.g., Escandon v. Pan American Foreign Corp., 88 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir.
1937) ("It is elementary that no recovery may be had for an assault and battery to pre-
vent or abate a trespass if no more force be used than is reasonably necessary.") ; Barley
v. Ferguson, 209 N.C. 264, 183 S.E. 275 (1936).
The standard plea in defense to a common law action in assault and battery was "mol-
liter manus imposuit" (he laid his hands on [the trespasser] gently).
For a thorough discussion of this subject, see Bohlen & Burns, The Privilege to Pro-
tect Property by Dangerous Barriers and Mechanical Dezices, 35 YALE L.J. 525 (1926) ;
HARPER, TORTS § 49 (1933); MILLER, CIMINAL LAw § 69 (1934); PRossEm, TORTS § 21
(1941) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 81-2 (1934).
58. See, e.g., McCoy v. Taylor Tire Co., 254 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Ky. 1953) ; Newcome
v. Russell, 133 Ky. 29, 117 S.W. 305 (1909); People v. Doud, 223 Mich. 120, 131, 193
N.W. 884, 887-8 (1923) ; cases collected in Note, 25 A.L.R. 508, 525 ct seq., 542-7, 560
(1923). See Bohlen & Bums, supra note 57, at 526 n.3, 540-7; MILL , CRIMINAL LAW
§69 (1934); PROSSER, TORTS §21 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§79, 85 comment a
(1934). But see Laney v. United States, 294 Fed. 412, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("[O]ne
may defend his domicile or his property to the extent of taking life, when necessary in
defense of his property, or to ,protect himself or those in his charge from death or bodily
injury.").
59. This statement is controversial, and the controversy extends to the use of non-
deadly as well as deadly force. The leading statement supporting the text is found in
Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn. 1, 11 (1840) ("[T]he law will not justify a man in caus-
ing injuries by such means [i.e., spring guns, poisoned food, etc.] which he cannot inflict
directly, with his own hands."). See State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 482 (1863) ; State v.
Childers, 133 Ohio St. 508, 14 N.E.2d 767 (1938); State v. Marfaudille, 48 Wash. 117,
121, 92 Pac. 939, 941 (1907). See also MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW §69(b) (1934); RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS §85 and the accompanying comments (1934). But see Bohlen &
Burns, supra note 57, at 538 ("It is more than doubtful whether it is, as is sometimes
supposed, a principle of common law that one may not do indirectly that which he may
not do directly."). In preceding passages the authors justified the use of such devices as
barbed wire fences on the ground that "the danger that such a fence or device may inflict
a bodily harm slightly in excess of that which the owner might inflict, if he were present
in person, is counterbalanced by the impracticability of otherwise protecting the property
from intrusions, whether harmless or harmful." Id. at 538. In later passages they argue
that greater force, applied indirectly through such devices, is justifiable against burglars
than would be justifiable if the land occupier were present, on the ground that "there
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he does, he will be liable even to a thief who is injured by such devicecO
Statute apart,"' he may use deadly means, either in person or by device,
where that is reasonably necessary to repel an invasion that threatens life
or serious bodily harm to the possessor or to someone he is legally entitled
to protect, 2 or threatens the breaking and entering of his dwelling (and
perhaps some other buildings) with felonious intent.6a But if mechanical
is no reason to protect actually dangerous intruders by restrictions which deprive the
householders of the possibility of effective protection"; and "granting... that the intruder
is, in fact, a burglar, there is less reason to be tender of his rights and interests." Id. at
545-6.
On the other hand, cases may arise where the application of an amount of force, which
would be justifiable if the possessor of land were present, would be unjustifiable if the
force were applied indirectly through mechanical devices. See, e.g., Grant v. Hass, 31
Tex. Civ. App. 68, 694-6, 75 S.W. 342. 345-6 (1903) (although picssessor may be justi-
fied in shooting at innccent trespasser if he reasonably believes latter is ab,5ut to steal,
yet this defense "calls for the presence of the party inflicting the injury . . . for his state
of mind . . . is what gives rise to the occasion to fire the shot, and is what completes
the defense."). See Allison v. Fiscus, 156 Ohio St. 120, 134, 100 N.E.2d 237, 244 (1951)
(dissenting opinion).
60. Hooker v. Miller, 37 Iowa 613 (1873) ; Allison v. Fiscus, supra note 59. See also
State v. Moore, supra note 59; State v. Marfaudille, supra note 59; Prossm, ToTs § 21
(1941) ; M mnRa, CRIMINAL LAW § 69 (1934) ; Note, 21 U. or Cm. L RE%. 269 (1952).
The cases which seem contra to the statement in the text were rationalized as follows
by Bohlen & Burns, supra note 57: "This conflict, however, is not based upon any dis-
tinction drawn between the privilege to kill or maim to prevent such an entry directly
and in person, and the privilege to do so indirectly by mechanical devices. It is based
upon a difference of view as to the conditions under which the privilege to ldll or maim
to prevent a felony arises." Id. at 540. See note 63 infra.
61. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 616.44 (1947) (forbidding the setting of any
"spring gun, pistol, rifle or other deadly weapon.").
62. REvsTATEMN-r, TORTS §§ 79, 85 (1934). This much is generally conceded. See
sources cited notes 58 supra and 63 infra.
63. See United States v. Gilliam, 25 Fed. Cas. 1319, No. 15,205a (D.C. 18,32) ; State
v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479, 482 (1863) ; cases cited in Notes, 25 A.L.R. 503 (1923), 32 id.
1541 (1924), 34 id. 1488 (1925).
The rationale of decisions justifying the application of deadly force on the sole ground
of the prevention of a felony appears fallacious. See, e.g., State v. Barr, 11 Wash. 481,
487, 39 Pac. 1080, 1032 (1895) ("The reason why the use of such means was allowed to
prevent crimes of that kind in England was that they were there punishable by death.
This being so, there was reason for the rule. If one -was about to perpetrate a crime for
which under the law his life would be forfeited, there was reason in holding that his life
might be taken if necessary to prevent his committing it. But in this country few crimes
subject the ones who have committed them to the death penalty, and it is only as to those
which do that the reason of the rule has any force."). See also Bohlen & Bums, supra
note 57, at 540-1 n.44 ("Whatever may be said as to the justice of permitting the un-
official imposition of the death penalty upon actual felons, it is certainly an extreme
penalty to attach to reasonably suspicious conduct to make the person unfortunate enough
to incur suspicion fair game for one who, however reasonably, misinterprets his actions.").
A sounder rule is that "the right of killing to prevent the perpetration of crime de-
pends more upon the character of the crime, and the time and manner of its attempted
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means are chosen, the occupier takes the risk that they will inflict injury
under circumstances wherein he would not have been privileged to use deadly
force if present, 64 as where a fireman is injured by a spring gun. Devices
that do not threaten serious injury, e.g., barbed wire, may be used to repel
trespassers, 65 except where forbidden by statute. 6
In the circumstances just discussed, it is often said defendant sets a "trap"
for the trespasser; and, where hidden danger is created with the trespasser
in mind, the expression is appropriate enough. But danger to a trespasser
may be just as great from conditions which are not aimed at the trespasser
at all, but created and maintained to serve a useful purpose of the possessor 7
Where such a condition is "highly dangerous" (e.g., a high tension electric
wire), where it is not likely to be perceived by the trespasser (e.g., con-
cealed by vegetation), and where it is brought home to defendant that tres-
passers are likely to be exposed to this risk by the frequency of trespass on
that part of the land where the danger is, some cases 08 and the Restatement 00
perpetration, than upon the degree of punishment attached to it by law, or upon the fact
of its being designated in the penal code as a felony or not." Gray v. Combs, 30 Ky.
(7 Marsh.) 478, 483, 23 Am. Dec. 431, 436 (1832). See also United States v. Gilliam,
stpra, at 1320.
64. Grant v. Hass, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 688, 694-6, 75 S.W. 342, 345-7 (1903) ; Rr-
STATEMENT, TORTS § 85 illustration 2, comment d (1934). See State v. Childers, 133 Ohio St.
508, 518, 14 N.E.2d 767, 771 (1938) ; PROSSER, TORTS 135 (1941) ; Bohlen & Burns, supra
note 57, at 546-7 (wherein the authors urge a different rule but prophesy that the courts
will probably follow the rule in the text).
65. Quigley v. Clough, 173 Mass. 429, 53 N.E. 884 (1899) ; Burrill v. Alexander, 75
N.H. 554, 78 Atl. 618 (1910). See also Bohlen & Burns, supra note 57, at 528-36.
66. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7156-7 (1949); MAss. ANN. LAws, c. 86, § 6
(1946).
67. Compare cases cited note 70 infra, with Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 91 Tex.
60, 64, 41 S.W. 62, 64 (1897) (rejection of the analogy of the trap except where con-
dition was "aimed at" the trespasser). See Note, 8 IND. L.J. 508 (1933).
68. The leading case is Clark v. Longview Pubic Service Co., 143 Wash. 319, 255
Pac. 380 (1927). Other decisions looking in the same direction are Cornucopia Gold
Mines v. Locken, 150 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1945); Burnett v. Ft. Worth L.S.P. Co., 117
S.W. 175 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) ; Meyer v. Menominee & M.L.T. Co., 151 Wis. 279, 138
N.W. 1008 (1912). Cf. Hobbs v. Geo. W. Blanchard & Son Co., 74 N.H. 116, 65 Atl.
382 (1906). In the Burnett and Meyer cases the trespassers were young (12 and 14) and
they were not trespassers as to defendant. But the reasoning in the opinions did not turn
on either of these points.
A trio' of California cases probably also supports the conclusion here. Malloy v.
Hibernia Say. & L. Soc., 3 Cal. Unrep. 76, 21 Pac. 525 (1889); Loftus v. Dehail, 133
Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901); Blaylock v. Coates, 44 Cal. App. 2d 850, 113 P,2d 256
(1941). In the Malloy case a very young child fell into an unguarded cesspool about 10
feet from the sidewalk. In the Loftus case (which denied liability) the court distinguished
the Malloy case by saying that there "the complaint would have been sufficient to have
warranted a recovery had an adult been killed under the same circumstances; for the
complaint showed a veritable trap,-a cesspool open and unguarded, yet with its surface
covered with a layer of deceptive earth to a level with the adjacent land. Into such a
trap any one, adult or child, might have walked." In the Blaylock case, a 13 year-old
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impose on the possessor a duty of care to protect such a trespasser (e.g., by
a warning) from the danger. Sometimes the analogy of the "trap" is in-
voked, 0 but the real basis of liability seems to be the grave danger of very
great harm.71 The Restatement rule has been used in favor of adults only
sparingly, and in extreme cases.72 There is here, however, a concept capable
of typical common law growth: "Highly dangerous" may become simply
"unreasonably dangerous" ;73 "concealed" may be watered down to that which
plaintiff might be expected in fact not to observe ;74 and the possessor may
come under a duty to inspect if the threatened danger is great enough.-
girl was held entitled to recover (though judgment in her favor was reversed on other
grounds) when she left the sidewalk to rescue her dog who was stuck in a nearby oil
sump, in which she also got stuck. Liability was sustained "under the general rule that
a landowner may not construct or maintain a trap or pitfall into which he has reason to
believe that a trespasser will probably fall." Cf. note 83 infra.
Cases looking in a direction opposite to that indicated in the text are Strother v.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 94 Cal. App. 2d 525, 211 P.2d 624 (1949); R. ;dger's Adm'r
v. Union L.H. & P. Co., 123 S.W. 293 (Ct. App. Ky. 1909).
69. RSTAT&-jENT, To.rs § 335 (1934).
70. Cornucopia Gold Mines v. Locken, supra note 6S, at 76 ("Ow;ing to the con-
dition of brush and vegetation surrounding the fallen wire, it virtually constituted a trap
for anyone walking or travelling in the Canyon."); TalUingtvn v. Waslingtn Power
Co., 96 Wash. 3S6, 3S9-90, 165 Pac. 87, I8 (1917) ("[Tlhis power line ... vwas never-
theless a very dangerous, silent and even deadly agency, and one which did ntot display
its dangers and make them so readily discei-nible as running machinery, high places tin-
protected by railings, or other similarly apparent dangers.").
71. See sources cited notes 111-114 infra and accompan ing te.x:t. See sources cited
notes 68-9 szapra.
72. See cases cited note 68 .mipra.
73. Note the development which has taken place in the cases dealing with the lia-
bility for negligence of a manufacturer to a remote vendee or uther third person with
whom the manufacturer had no contractual relationship. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319
Mass. 92, 103, 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (1946) ("The [acceptance of the] doctrine of the
McPherson case . . . has brought all dangerous things into the same class as the 'in-
herently dangerous' things to which the principle already stated has always been ap-
plied."). See Anderson v. Linton, 178 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1949) ; Brown v. Bigelov, 325
Mass. 4, 88 N.E2d 542 (1949); Note, 164 A.L.R. 569 (1946). See also James, Scope
of Duly in, Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 778, 798-9 (1953).
74. Note the development which has taken place in the cases dealing vith the lia-
bility of a possessor of land to a licensee for injuries resulting from "concealed perils:'
In Washington, liability is apparently still confined to "e.%traordinary concealed perils,"
Christensen v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 16 Wash. 2d 424, 432, 133 P2d 797, SO (1943).
In Connecticut, liability has been extended to "dangerous conditions which the possesaor
knows of but which he cannot reasonably assume.. . the licensee knows of or by reason-
able use of his faculties would observe." Lubenow v. Cook, 137 Conn. 611, 614, 79 A2d
826,828 (1951).
75. Such a duty was apparently imposed by the court in Cornucopia Gold Mines v.
Locken, 150 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1945) : "We conclude that where as in this case the
owner of such a transmission line wire negligently fails to inspocl and repair it and allows
it to become in disrepair and sag near and rest upon brush in wild unfenced mountainous
... country, so that one leaving a nearby road and walking neur or uver such trans-
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But the duty to trespassers will probably always be limited, as it is now,
by the fact that while consciously trespassing, they generally do not expect
land to be prepared for their safety and realize they must keep a lookout
for their own protection. 76 The occupier, on his side, may reasonably rely
on this fact, even if he is subjected to the full duty of care, and all the pre-
cautions that may be required of him will be measured in this light.7 This
would affect the judgment of what is dangerous and what is concealed, the
frequency and carefulness of any inspection that might be required, the ade-
quacy of warning, and so on. The man, for instance, who picks his way in
the dark between automobiles in a used car lot and falls into an unguarded
grease pit, will be unlikely to recover on any foreseeable tort theory. 78 Per-
haps the careful formulation of the Restatement 7) may be taken as express-
ing the rule of negligence with special emphasis on the notion that the occupier
may expect trespassers to look out sharply for their own safety-an emphasis
which courts may use for tighter control of the jury. At any rate, develop-
ment beyond the somewhat crystallized Restatement rule to the elasticity
usually associated with the negligence formula is likely to be hesitant and un-
mission line would likely come in contact with it and be thereby injured, is guilty of
reckless conduct and wanton negligence rendering the owner liable for resulting personal
injury. .. ." (emphasis added).
See also Weimer v. Westmoreland Water Co., 127 Pa. Super. 201, 193 Atd. 665
(1937), in which defendant was held liable although on the facts of the particular case,
the sole cause of the injury was a defective chain, the danger of which could only have
been disclosed by an inspection. However, this point was apparently not raised by the
defendant in either the lower or higher court. See Eldredge, Tort Liability to Tres-
passers, 12 TEmP. L.Q. 32 (1937). A later Pennsylvania case, Rush v. Plains Twp., 371
Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952), is equivocal as to this duty. Here defendant should have
known that children often trespassed on the town dump where plaintiff was burned when
part of the surface caved in because of subsurface fires. Plaintiff was denied recovery
because the danger was "a latent condition of which the defendant did not have any actual
knowledge, or constructive notice. . . ." Id. at 121, 89 A.2d at 201, (emphasis added). A
dissenting judge stoutly maintained that the evidence did show a basis for constructive
notice, saying "Everything is latent to one who closes his eyes, but if one chooses to
shut off his vision while hurling a dangerous missile, he cannot escape responsibility for
the damage done the struck individual by asserting that he did not see him." Id. at 125,
89 A.2d at 203.
76. See p. 153 supra.
77. Note the continuing emphasis on the likelihood that trespassing children will
observe dangerous conditions in the "attractive nuisance" cases. See, e.g., Plotzki v.
Standard Oil Co., 228 Ind. 518, 92 N.E.2d 632 (1950); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v.
Powers, 206 Okla. 322, 243 P.2d 688 (1952). See Spear v. Wineman, 335 Mich. 287, 290,
55 N.W.2d 833, 834 (1952) (since a business visitor was not required to be on the alert
to discover defects, owner was negligent in maintaining them, though he might not have
been liable to a licensee for the same defects, since a licensee would have been expected
to keep a sharper lookout). REsTATmE T, ToRTs § 343 comment d (1934).
78. Hume v. Hart, 109 Cal. App. 2d 614, 241 P.2d 25 (1952) (plaintiff's appeal in a
similar fact situation said by the court to border on the frivolous).
79. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 335 (1934).
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even. Development in the past has been most marked in cases involving con-
ditions near highways, trespassing children, and active intervention. It is to
these areas which our examination now turns.
Conditions Near Highways
The occupier of land owes a duty of care to prevent artificial conditions
on his land from being unreasonably dangerous to highway travelers s9 More-
over, if he arranges part of his premises so as to lead people to think that
they are part of the highway, e.g., by paving part of his land as a continuation
of the sidewalk, he comes under a duty of care to keep that part of his land
reasonably safe for travelers."' But his duties go further than this. The law
recognizes that travelers are likely to stray or be forced inadvertently from
the boundaries of the highway, and requires possessors of abutting land to use
care to prevent artificial conditions on it from being unreasonably dangerous
to those who may foreseeably deviate in this way.8 2 Thus the landowner has
a duty not to create or maintain an unguarded excavation so near the highway
as to be unreasonably dangerous to highway travel, even though the excava-
tion is entirely on his own land. 3
Further, the law recognizes that there are many ordinary and expectable
incidents of travel along the highways that may involve technical, sometimes
even intentional, trespass on neighboring lands. Children, for instance, must
be expected to play as they go along the road and this may include straying
80. 65 C.J.S., Negligence §§77-8 (1950); REsTATmrr, TORTs §§354-S (1934).
81. Crogan v. Schiele, 53 Conn. 186, 5 AUt. 673 (1885) ; Holmes v. Drew, 151 Mass.
578, 25 N.E. 22 (1890).
82. The cases are collected in Notes. 14 A.L.R. 1397 (1921), 159 A.L.LR. 136 (1945);
cf. 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 78 (1950).
83. Sanders v. Reister, 1 Dak. 151, 46 NAV. 6S( (1875); Beck v. Carter, 6 N.Y.
283 (1877) ; Kelly v. Sabin Estates, 279 App. Div. 348, 109 N.Y.S2d 747 (1st Dep't 1952) ;
Rasmus v. Penn. R.RL, 164 Pa. Super. 635, 67 A.2d 660 (1949). But see McIntire v. Rob2rts,
149 Mass. 450, 22 N.E. 13 (1889) (responsibility on city rather than abutting owner).
In Loftus v. Dehail, 133 Cal. 214, 65 Pac. 379 (1901), no liability was imposed where
pit was 30 feet from street and child was pushed into it. The court distinguished the
earlier case of Malloy v. Hibernia Say. & L Soc., 3 Cal. Unrep. 76, 21 Pac. 525 (1889),
where a 3 year old child fell into an unguarded cesspool "with a layer of deceptive
earth" over it, some 10 feet from the sidewalk, by calling the conditions "a veritable
trap [into which] any one, adult or child, might have walked." Id. at 218, 65 Pac. at 330.
The Malloy case has been cited as one where the victim came onto defendant's land as
a normal incident of highway travel. Barlow v. Los Angeles County, 95 Cal. App. 2d
979, 985, 216 P.2d 903, 907 (1950). But if that was the ground of action, it appears
only inferentially from the complaint (the case was decided on demurrer). And Malloy
may well stand for the broader principle "that a landowner may not construct or main-
tain a trap or pitfall into which he knows or has reason to believe that a trespasser will
probably fall." Blaylock v. Coates, 44 Cal. App. 2d 850, 852, 113 P.2d 255, 257 (1941).
In this view of Malloy the prodmity of the highway was significant only as showing
the likelihood of trespassers, and liability would be imposed without regard to the ques-
tion whether the plaintiff's entry on defendant's land might be regarded as an incident
of legitimate highway travel. See note 68 mtpra.
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from the road, or touching fences and adjacent buildings with a stick, so that
it may be negligence to leave an exposed electric wire inside the recess of a
doorway letting onto the sidewalk, even though the wire is entirely within
defendant's property.8 4 Again, it is foreseeable that motorists may stop to
relieve nature or change a tire, and that in doing so they are likely to seek
shelter or shade that may be off the highway. Negligence may be predicated
on creating or maintaining a condition unreasonably dangerous to people
foreseeably engaged in such ways.85
In all these cases the trespass aspect is not made controlling and the courts
are apt to use a straight negligence approach.80 This means that the duty and
its scope depend upon foreseeability of harm under all the circumstances. The
proximity of the danger to the highway, the extent and character of travel,
the past practices of travelers, the seriousness of the danger and the likeli-
hood that it will be seen and avoided, and the physical surroundings of the
danger, would be among the variable factors entitled to consideration in de-
ciding this cardinal question. s7 And here again they should be regarded in this
light and not erected into rigid rules of thumb.
8 8
84. E.g., Ruocco v. United Advertising Corp., 98 Conn. 241, 119 Atl. 48 (1922);
Haywood v. South Hill Mfg. Co., 142 Va. 761, 128 S.E. 362 (1925). Cf. Sedita v. Stein-
berg, 105 Conn. 1, 134 Atl. 243 (1926).
85. Adults have been allowed to recover where they have encountered conditions on
a landowner's property because they have strayed inadvertently, or have been forced from
the highway, as by an obstruction. See, e.g., Sawicki v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co.,
129 Conn. 626, 30 A.2d 556 (1943); Athens E. L. & P. Co. v. Tanner, 225 S.W. 421
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920); sources cited in notes 81-3 supra. Recovery has been denied
where the adult intentionally left the highway. See, e.g., Frankum v. Farlinger, 35 Ga.
App. 305, 132 S.E. 923 (1926) (no liability to one "traveling along the road upon a dark
night in an automobile, who leaves the automobile and goes uninvited upon the premises,
and, at a point 8 or 10 feet from the road, falls into an unguarded well"); Anderson v.
Speer, 36 Ga. App. 29, 134 S.E. 811 (1926) (no liability to a lady who fell down an un-
lighted stairway adjacent to the sidewalk, because she voluntarily and intentionally de-
viated from the sidewalk, for the purpose of better viewing an attractive show window).
But cf. Gibson v. Johnson, 69 Ohio App. 19, 42 N.E.2d 689 (1941) (liability to plaintiff
who, in order to allow others to pass, stepped off sidewalk into an unguarded defective
water meter box) ; Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217, 36 Am. Rep. 367 (1879) (liability
imposed where brick fell from the wall of a house and injured plaintiff who had sat down
on defendant's door step to fix his shoe).
The intent of the plaintiff should be merely one factor to consider in determining lia-
bility, and -not an automatic bar to recovery in all cases. See Note, 36 Micu. L. RLV.
159 (1937).
86. See, e.g., Sinclair Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ross, 175 Okla. 435, 437, 54 P2d 204,
206 (1935).
87. Crogan v. Shiele, 53 Conn. 186, 5 Atl. 673 (1885). See Norwich v. Breed, 30
Conn. 535, 544-7 (1826) (dangerous character of condition, rather than its exact location,
determines the duty). But cf. Hardcastle v. So. Yorkshire Ry., 4 H. & N. 67, 157 Eng.
Rep. 761 (1859) ; Binks v. So. Yorkshire Ry., 3 B. & S. 244, 122 Eng. Rep. 92 (1862) ;
Gramlich v. Wurst, 86 Pa. 74, 27 Am. Rep. 684 (1878), which are generally cited for the
proposition that the deviation must not be substantial.




Where a duty of care is owed, the likelihood of the presence of children has
great bearing on deciding whether or not conduct is reasonable.89 But under
the older theory here, no duty of care was owed to trespassers and such a
duty was not created by the likelihood that children--or anybody else--would
trespass.90 This meant, for instance, that a landowner might wfith impunity
leave dangerous machinery or other conditions unguarded on his own land
even if it adjoined a primary school's playground.0 1 The dramatic harshness
of such a result led to one of the earliest and best known departures from
the stricter rule. A leading American case was Siour City & Pacific Railroad
Co. v. Stolt,92 wherein a six year old boy sued for an injury sustained while
he was playing with other boys on an unguarded, unlocked turntable main-
tained by defendant on its own land, in an unfenced open space "about eighty
rods from the company's depot, in a hamlet or settlement of one hundred to
one hundred and fifty persons," near a road through the depot grounds "and
another travelled road nearby." There was evidence that children had played
there before, when railroad employees were present; also that an employee
had "forbidden them from playing there." The Supreme Court paid very
little attention to the trespass aspect of the case, remarking simply that de-
fendant's waiver of. contributory negligence covered also any possible bar to
plaintiff based on the wrongfulness of his trespass. The likelihood of presence
and of harm was found to be the basis of a duty to use care, and the jury's
implied finding of failure to take reasonable precautions was allowed to stand.
This reasoning may be termed a straight negligence approach of a kind that
is now coming into increasing favor with courts 93 and commentators ;04 but
it came fifty years too soon to win general judicial acceptance at the time.
The opinion failed to grapple with the paramount conceptual difficulty in the
case, as the contemporary legal mind would view it, namely the lack of duty
to use affirmative care towards any trespasser. 3  Since there was no such
89. E.g., Terranella v. Union Bldg. & Const. Co., 3 N.J. 443, 449, 70 A.2d 753, 75G
(1950) ("Where, as here, the obligation exists primarily in relation to groups of young
children, that in itself is one of the concomitant circumstances to be weighed.").
90. See Friedman v. Snare & Triest Co., 71 N.J.L. 695, 611-12, 61 At. 401, 493
(1905). See cases cited note 97 infra.
91. Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 AtL 85S (1911).
92. 17 Wall. 657 (U.S. 1873).
93. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Rebbein, 123 Conn. 110, 115-16, 193 Ad. 603, 610 (1937).
94. See, e.g., Green, Landozcner v. Intrudcr; Intruder v. Landouner. Basis of Re-
sponsibility ii Tort, 21 Mrc. L. REv. 495, 518-19 (1923) ; Hudson, The Turntable Cases
in the Federal Courts, 36 HAnv. L. REv. 82-6, 844-53 (1923) ; REsrTATr=!a, Tonrms §339
(1934).
95. See Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 91 Tex. 60, 63-4, 41 S.W. 62, 64 (1897).
At this time the notion of a "trap" v.-as pretty- closely confined to the spring gun and
vicious animal type of situation. See, e.g., Daniels v. N.Y. & N.E.R-R., 154 Mass. 349,
352-3, 2S N.E. 283, 234 (1891) ; Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., supra.
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duty in the first place, the questions whether the wrongfulness of trespass
was a bar, and whether there was negligence, never should have been
reached.96
Dissatisfaction with the reasoning in the Stout case took two forms. A
good many states-including many of the industrial ones-repudiated lia-
bility altogether and preserved intact the occupier's immunities.9 7 The im-
possibility of preventing trespasses of children, without incurring ruinous
expense, 98 the propensity of juries to favor plaintiffs,9 9 and the burden on
the useful exploitation of land were all stressed. 10 0 The primary duty of keep-
ing children away from dangerous industrial development was thought to lie
with their parents.1 1 The more "liberal" courts, on the other hand, sought
to justify the result of the Stout case by reasoning they found more palatable,
and seized upon the analogy of decisions like Tounsend v. Wathen,1°' in
which defendant baited traps with stinking meat in order to lure dogs onto
his land to their destruction. 10 3 These courts reasoned that if the child came
onto the land because of an artificial, highly dangerous, unguarded thing cer-
tain to attract young children; and if the child was of an age when it would
"follow a bait as mechanically as a fish," without appreciation of its danger;
then the possessor's act of creating or maintaining such a condition was
deemed an "invitation," and the child an invitee to whom the duty of care
was owed.' 04 Once this hurdle had been jumped, the concept of negligence
96. Dobbins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., supra note 95, at 62, 41 S.W. at 63.
97. Ibid. See also Savannah, F. & W. Ry. v. Beavers, 113 Ga. 398, 39 S.E. 82
(1901); Daniels v. N.Y. & N.E.R.R., 154 Mass. 349, 28 N.E. 283 (1891); Ryan v.
Towar, 128 Mich. 463, 87 N.W. 644 (1901) ; Frost v. Eastern R.R., 64 N.H. 220, 9 Atl.
790 (1886); Walsh v. Fitchburg R.R., 145 N.Y. 301, 39 N.E. 1068 (1895); Paolino v.
McKendall, 24 R.I. 432, 53 Atl. 268 (1902); Ritz v. City of Wheeling, 45 W. Va. 262,
31 S.E. 993 (1898).
98. See, e.g., Ritz v. City of Wheeling, supra note 97, at 270, 31 S.E at 997 ("And where
will not the curiosity, the thoughtlessness, and the agile feet of the truant boy carry him?").
99. See Ryan v. Towar, 128 Mich. 463, 470-1, 87 N.W. 644, 646-7 (1901).
100. See cases cited note 97 supra. See Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children
Entering Without Permission; -II, 11 HARV. L. REV. 349, 434 (1898).
101. See Ryan v. Towar, sipra note 99, at 479, 87 N.W. at 649-50. See Smith, sufpra
note 100.
102. 9 East 277, 103 Eng. Rep. 579 (K.B. 1808).
103. Cf. the analogy used by Holmes, J., in United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt,
258 U.S. 268, 275 (1921) ("[K]nowingly to establish and expose, unfenced, to children
of an age when they follow a bait as mechanically as a fish, something that is certain to
attract them, has the legal effect of an invitation to them although not to an adult.").
The analogy was specifically rejected by the New York Court of Appeals in Walsh v.
Fitchburg R.R., 145 N.Y. 301, 39 N.E. 1068 (1895) on the ground that "The act of the
defendant in [Townsend] was not done in the prosecution of his immediate and proper
business, but, as the court held, was a mere malicious attempt ... to entice his neighbor's
animals upon his property.... ." Id. at 309.
104. Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry., 21 Minn. 207, 211-12, 18 Am. Rep. 393, 395-6
(1875) ("Now, what an express invitation would be to an adult, the temptation of an
attractive plaything is to a child of tender years .... [t]he defendant. . .knew that by
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became relevant. 0 5 This became known, as the "attractive nuisance" or "turn-
table" doctrine ;1o it made the possessor liable if plaintiff could show both
allurement and negligence.10 7 The requirement of allurement proved severe.103
Thus liability was denied where a child was killed by swimming on a hot
day in a pool, inviting in appearance but poisoned in fact, because he did not
see the pool till he was already a trespasser.0 0  The evidence showed that
such trespassing in the vicinity was frequent, so that probability of harm was
very great, but there was no "invitation."".
0
The feeling grew, however, that the real basis of the doctrine was not the
spurious invitation but the "value of child life to the community" and the
great probability of harm to that interest from dangerous conditions of land
left exposed beyond the needs of their use;"' especially as an increasingly
leaving this turn-table unfastened and unguarded, it was not merely inviting young chil-
dren to come upon the turn-table, but was holding out an allurement, which, acting upon
the natural instincts by which such children are controlled, drew them by those instincts
into a hidden danger... .").
105. Ibid. See also, Barrett v. Southern Pacific Co., 91 Cal. -96, 27 Pac. 6 6 (IS91);
Kansas Central Ry. v. Fitzimmons, 22 Kan. 66 (1879); Koons v. St. Louis & Iron
Mountain R.R., 65 Mo. 592 (1877) ; A. & N.R. Co. v. Bailey, 11 Neb. 332, 9 N.V. 50
(1881) ; Ilwaco Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Hedrick, 1 Wash. 446, 25 Pac. 335 (1S90).
106. It has also been referred to as the "attractive agencies," "attractive instrumen-
talities," or "torpedo" doctrine. Schock v. Ringling Bros., 5 Wash. 2d 599, 6Q0, 105 P.2d
833, 842 (1940). The cases are collected in Notes, 36 A.L.R. 34 (1925), 39 A.LR. 4Q6
(1925), 45 A.L.R. 982 (1926), 53 A.L.R. 1344 (1928), 60 A.LR. 1444 (1929).
107. The allurement requirement was often made double-barreld, sk as tQ include
both (a) a requirement that the trespasser was induced to come onto the property as a
result of the attractiveness of some object on the property, United Zinc & Chemical Cu.
v. Britt, 25S U.S. 268 (1922) ; Salt River Valley Ass'n v. Compton, 40 Ariz. 232, 2 9,
11 P.2d 839, 842 (1932) ; Hayko v. Colo. & Utah Coal Co., 77 Colo. 143, 146, 235 Pac.
373, 374 (1925) ; McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401, 407, 100 N.E. 163, 170 (1912) ; and
(b) a requirement that the attractive object be the proximate cause of the injury, Sey-
mour v. Union Stock Yards Co., 224 Ill. 579, 586, 79 N.E. 950, 951 (190&) ; McDermott
v. Burke, supra at 407, 100 N.E. at 170; Swartwood's Guardian v. Louisville & N.R.R.,
129 Ky. 247, 254, 111 S.V. 305, 307 (1903).
108. See cases cited note 107 supra.
109. United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 263 (1922).
110. The pool was located within a vacant, unfenced lot, approximately 1OD0 feet by
1200 feet, immediately adjacent to a city of 10,000 inhabitants. There was no sign or
warning of any kind indicating the dangerous character of the pooL There were several
paths across the lot which were used by people, generally without objection, as a short
cut; a public highw.ay ran within 100 to 120 feet of the pool and a railway track not far
away. See Justice Clarke's dissenting opinion on the great probability of harm. Id. at
276.
However Holmes held that "it does not appear that children were in the habit of
going to the place [i.e., the pool, not the path] .... It is suggested that the roads across
the place were invitations. A road is not an invitation to leave it elsewhere than at its
end." Id. at 276.
111. Bohlen, Mixed Qestions of Law and Fact, 72 U. or P.,, L Rmv. 111, 120
(1924) ; Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, supra note 75, at 50. See Thompson v.
Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 591-2, 23 A.2d 729, 732 (1942).
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industrial society multiplied both the dangers and the devices which might
reduce them. This attitude has led many courts 112 and the Restatenent ""
to reject, in the case of children, the premise on which the occupier's special
immunities rested, i.e., a judgment that full utilization of land required im-
munity even at the expense of the lives and limbs of people, and to substitute
the more flexible test of negligence which would balance these competing in-
terests on a case to case basis.114 This has paved the way to reviving the
simple and forthright approach in the Stout case. Ironically enough, some
of the states which originally rejected "attractive nuisance" have now em-
braced the broader doctrine espoused by the Restatement,"0, while some states
which accepted the then "liberal" view at an early day, still cling to its harsh
vestigial requirement of allurement.""
The four requirements of the more modern Restatement view which the
plaintiff must satisfy center around unreasonable probability of harm. First,
there must be the probability that children will be exposed to the danger.
This may be shown by evidence of allurement.117 It may also be shown by
evidence of repeated former trespasses," 8 by the proximity of the danger to
a highway or to residences, schools, or playgrounds where children are likely
112. See cases cited note 114 infra. The development in Indiana, Illinois, and Wis-
consin is sketched in 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 722 (1952). But see Neal v. Home Builders,
Inc., - Ind. -, 111 N.E.2d 280 (1953) (indicating some retreat from position described in
27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 722). See also Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843
(1948) ; Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 591-2, 23 A.2d 729, 732 (1942).
113. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs §339 (1934). Comment f is a typical example of what
might be termed a straight negligence approach.
114. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 111, 116, 193 AtI. 608, 610-11 (1937)
("If the presence of children is to be anticipated, the care to be exercised is such as is
reasonable having in view the probability that children, because of their youth, will not
discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming
within the area made dangerous by it [pile of lumber].") ; Drew v. Lett, 95 Ind. App. 89,
97, 182 N.E. 547, 549 (1932); Wagner v. Kepler, 411 Ill. 368, 104 N.E.2d 231 (1951);
Larson v. Equity Coop. Elevator Co., 248 Wise. 132, 21 N.W.2d 253 (1946).
115. Compare Wolfe v. Rehbein, supra note 114 (accepts Restatemwnt doctrine), uith
Wilmot v. McPadden, 79 Conn. 367, 65 At. 157 (1906) (rejects attractive nuisance doc-
trine) ; Compare Larson v. Equity Coop. Elevator Co., supra note 114 (accepts Restate-
ment doctrine), with Zartner v. George, 156 Wise. 131, 145 N.W. 971 (1914) (rejects
attractive nuisance doctrine).
116. See note 107 supra.
117. See Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949) ; Green,
Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in Tort, supra
note 4, at 521; Hudson, supra note 94, at 849; see sources cited note 111 supra. But see
Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 111, 116, 193 Atl. 608, 610 (1937) (which, in repeating the
former rejection of the attractive nuisance doctrine, uses language that may cast some
doubt on the sufficiency of allurement alone to show likelihood of children's presence).
118. Parsons v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 115 W. Va. 450, 176 S.E. 862
(1934) ; Wagner v. Kepler, 411 Ill. 368, 104 N.E.2d 231 (1951) ; cf. Rahe v. Philadelphia
Trust Co., 318 Pa. 376, 178 Atl. 467 (1935).
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to be," 9 by the accessibility of the dangerous condition to children;'20 or by
any other evidence having a rational tendency to indicate a likelihood of
children's presence in such a way as to bring that fact home to the occupier.'-"
Unless plaintiff can show the likelihood of children's presence where the dan-
ger was maintained, he cannot recover under this theory.'
In addition to the probability of trespass, the dangerous condition of the
premises must be produced by man, and either created or maintained by the
occupier.m This requirement stems from the law's reluctance to impose
purely affirmative obligations on a man.- 4 It is sometimes said that man-
made conditions which merely reproduce natural ones stand on the same foot-
ing.'23 But if there is to be exemption here it must obviously rest on a dif-
ferent basis. That basis may often be found in the fact that children are like-
ly to appreciate the risks of natural dangers, such as water,2 G fire,'2 or high
119. Long v. Standard Oil Co., 92 Cal App. 2d 455, 207 P.2d 837 (1949); Strang
v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, S6 A.2d 777 (1952). Cf. Morris v. City of
Britton, 66 S.D. 121, 279 N.W. 531 (1938). But cf. Gotcher v. City of Farmersville, 137
Tex. 12, 151 S.W.2d 565 (1941).
120. Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 23 A.2d 729 (1942) ; Shemper v. Cleve-
land, 212 Miss. 113, 54 So.2d 215 (1951).
That the danger is within a building will not necessarily preclude recovery. Branden-
berg v. Equity Coop. Exch., 160 Minn. 162, 19) N.W. 570 (1924) (recovery alhwed);
Weiner v. Westmoreland Water Co., supra note 75 (same) ; Nichols v. Consolidated Dairies,
- Alont. -, 234 P.2d 740 (1952) (same). But cf. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Pierce, 145
Ga. 130, 83 S.E. 672 (1915) (recovery denied).
121. E.g., Wolfe v. Rehbein, 123 Conn. 111, 193 At. 603 (1931) (lumber piled partly
on plaintiff's land) ; Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So2d 791 (1949)
(pool maintained by defendant in residential subdivision it was developing); Rush v.
Plains Twp., 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200 (1952) (nature of place, xz.&, touwm dump).
122. McPheters v. Loomis, 125 Conn. 526, 7 A.2d 437 (1939); Jennings v. Glen
Alden Coal Co., 369 Pa. 532, 87 A.2d 206 (1952).
123. See note 27 supra and accompanying tetL
124. See sources cited note 26 supra.
125. Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co., 228 Ind. App. 170, 92 N.E.2d 632 (1950), criticized
in Note, 4 V.,nm. L. REv. 198 (1950); Anderson v. Reith-Riley Construction Co., 112
Ind. App. 170, 44 N.E2d 184 (1942) ; Zagar v. Union Pacific R.R., 113 Ran. 240, 214
Pac. 107 (1923); Harper v. Topeka, 92 an. 11, 139 Pac. 1018 (1914).
126. E.g., Melendez v. Los Angeles, S Cal. 2d 741, 63 P2d 971 (1937) (10 year-old
boy); Phipps v. Mitze, 116 Colo. 28, 180 P.2d 233 (1947) (9 year-old boy); M1assie v.
Copeland, 149 Te-. 319, 233 S.W.2d 449 (1950), rcvrsing 223 S.W2d. 960 (1950) (14
year-old boy) (the two opinions should be compared to sharpen appreciation of the un-
derlying issues); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Powers, 206 Okla. 322, 243 P.2d 603 (1952),
and cases cited therein. See Notes, 36 A.LR. 34, 231 (1925), 8 A.L.R.2d 1254 (1949).
Bu~t cf. Mloore v. North Chicago Refiners & Smelters, Inc., 346 Ill. App. 530, 105 N.F.2d
553 (1952) (4 year-old boys); Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Te. 434, 203 S.W2d &43
(1948) (5 year-old boy; distinguished in Ma.ssic case supra on difference in ages). Bao!nh-
er evoked much favorable comment. Green, Landou-nrs' Responsfbiity to Children, 27
TExAs L. REv. 1 (1948); 1 BAYiLoR L. REv. 73 (1943); 3 SouTvw-svzi I.J. 7S
(1949) ; 26 TFxus L. REv. 821 (1943).
127. See, e.g., Lentz v. Schuerman Building & Realty Co., 359 Mo. 103, 220 SAV.2d
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places, 128 so that these conditions are not highly dangerous to them. But this
is not always the case. Some natural conditions have more concealed danger
than a turntable,12 and if a landowner reproduces such a "natural trap,"
liability should not be excluded.130  Given affirmative arrangement of the
premises, the touchstone of liability should be unreasonable probability of
harm.131 All other criteria should be used as guides only, and not erected into
rigid rules.'
3 2
Thirdly, the condition must be one which is likely to cause serious injury
'or death to a child '33 in a way which he is not likely to appreciate and
avoid.'3 4 This double-barrelled requirement bears on the likelihood of harm
and the gravity of the harm if it happens.' 35 The age of the child will affect
the likelihood that he will encounter danger and his ability to appreciate and
58 (1.949) (3 year-old boy). But cf. Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Lester, 219 Ark. 413, 242
S.W.2d 714 (1951) (5 year-old boy); Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Co.. 9 N.J.
38, 86 A.2d 777 (1952) (6 year-old child).
128. See, e.g., Sanders v. Baird, 195 Ark. 535, 112 S.W.2d 966 (1938); Zagar v.
Union Pacific R.R., 113 Kan. 240, 214 Pac. 107 (1923) ; Coon v. Kentucky & I.T.R.R..
163 Ky. 223, 173 S.W. 325 (1915) ; Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., 23 N.J. Super. 9, 92
A.2d 498 (1952). But cf. Heitman v. Lake City, 225 Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18 (1947).
129. See, e.g., Smith v. Windsor R. & C. Co., 78 Colo. 169, 240 Pac. 332 (1925) ; 82
Colo. 497, 261 Pac. 872 (1927); 88 Colo. 422, 298 Pac. 646 (1931); 92 Colo. 480, 21
P.2d 116 (1933) (false bank of reservoir); Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co., 228 Ind. 518,
92 N.E.2d 632 (1950) (numerous sharp drops and deep holes in bottom of artificial pool).
130. Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948). Cf. Long v.
Standard Oil Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 455, 207 P.2d 837 (1949).
131. See Chief Justice Emmert's dissent in Plotzki v. Standard Oil Co., sUpra note
129, at 520, 92 N.E.2d at 635: "The reasoning that there should be no difference, in deter-
mining non-liability, between a natural body of water and an artificially created body of water
is wholly specious from the standpoint of causation, as well as human experience. The
act of God creates a natural body of water, and from common experience we know that
society, from the first settlement, accommodates itself and builds with reference to the
existing conditions for which no man is responsible. But when man acts affirmatively the
general rule is he must use due care under the circumstances to avoid injuring others."
Judge Gilkinson's dissent thoroughly analyzed the relevant legal precedents and concluded
that "no matter how exclusive may be the property rights of the appellee to the use of
the pond in question, it is the apparent probability of danger to the children of the com-
munity, rather than the rights of property of appellee that determines its duty and the
measure of care required of it under the situation prevailing." Id. at 538, 92 N.E.2d at 644.
This approach was frankly adopted in Banker v. McLaughlin, supra note 130, at 438-42,
208 S.W.2d at 846-8. See also Moore v. North Chicago Refiners & Smelters, Inc., $11pra
note 126; cases cited note 118 supra.
Commentators have advocated this approach for some time. See, e.g., Green, mtpra
note 4, at 514-15; Note, 4 VAm. L. REv. 198 (1950).
132. Cf. Banker v. McLaughlin, supra note 130, at 441, 444, 208 S.W2d at 847, 849.
And see Green, supra note 4, at 517-522; Hudson, supra note 94, at 844-53.
133. RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 339, comment b (1934). See note 149 infra.
134. See sources cited notes 136-48 infra.
135. See James, supra note 39, at 280-3.
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avoid it.'3 6 The older the child, the less the danger that many conditions
will have for him.13 7 Consequently, the age of foreseeable trespassers is de-
cidedly a factor in determining the negligence of the landowner.1a' But even
adults are likely to encounter some dangers (while trespassing but acting
carefully) such as concealed high-tension wires.139 No hard and fast rule as
to age should therefore be drawn. 1 4" There has been a tendency, however,
to confine the present doctrine to very young children; seldom has recovery
been granted to a child over fourteen.14 ' This may be, in part, a confusion
of the issues of duty and contributory negligence ;14" in part, a hangover from
136. "Age is at once a factor which may bear on the likelihood of the visitor's com-
ing on the land, and on the visitor's capacity to look after himself after he is there."
Hudson, supra note 94, at 347.
137. Conpare Massie v. Copeland, 149 Te. 319, 233 S.V2d 449 (190), illh
Banker v. 'McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 203 S.W.2d 343 (1948) (14 year-old child held, as
a matter of law, to appreciate the peril of a pit of water which a 5 year-Ad child vwas
held unable to appreciate; so there may be duty to latter and not to former). See also
Giddings v. Superior Oil Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d 607, 612, 235 P.2d 843, S45 (1951) ("A\'hat
might constitute an attractive nuisance to a 7 year-old child would be immaterial as ap-
plied to a 14 year-old high school student.").
Age, of course, is not the only variable; a 6 year-old boy has been capable of appre-
ciating the danger of a 30-foot fall from the top of a tank. Stimson v. Bartex P.L. Co.,
120 Tex. 232, 36 S.V.2d 473 (1931).
138. No liability was imposed in the following cases: Garrett v. Arkansas Power &
Light Co., 218 Ark. 575, 237 S.W.2d 895 (1951) (17 year-old boy) ; Moseley v. Kansas
City, 170 Kan. 585, 228 P.2d 699 (1951) (16 year-old boy) ; Kentucky Utilities Co. v.
Earles' Adm'r, 311 Ky. 5, 222 S.W.2d 929 (1949) (14 year-old boy) ; Keck v. Wood-
ring, 201 Okla. 665, 208 P.2d 1133 (1948) ; Massie v. Copeland, supra note 137 (14 year-
old boy).
139. E.g., Clark v. Longview Public Service Co., 143 Wash. 319, 255 Pac. 3SO
(1927) ; Cornucopia Gold Mines v. Locken, 150 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1945).
140. "In a large measure, each case must be determined in this respect, not alone by
age, but by the degree of mentality and intelligence possessed by the child, as shown by
the evidence, to observe and appreciate the particular danger." McKiddy v. Des Moines
Electric Co., 202 Iowa 225, 229-30, 206 N.W. 815, 817 (1926). See Clark v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co., 118 Cal. App. 344, 5 P.2d 53 (1931) ; Cicero State Bank ,. Dolese
& Shepard Co., 298 Ill. App. 290, 18 N.E2d 574 (1939); Biggs v. Consolidated Barb-
Wire Co., 60 Kan. 217, 56 Pac. 4 (1S99) ; Ekdahl v. Minnesota Utilities Co., 203 Minn.
374, 281 N.V. 517 (1938) ; Schorr v. Minnesota Utilities Co., 203 Minn. 384, 231 .V.
523 (1938). See also PRossER, ToRTs 623-4 (1941) ; Note, 23 MiN:z. L REv. 241, 242
(1938). But see sources cited note 138 supra.
141. See Notes, 36 A.L.R. 141 (1925), 39 id. at 489 (1925), 45 id. at 913 (192Q),
53 id. at 1351 (1928), 60 id. at 1450 (1929), 8 A.L.R.2d 1300 (1949). Cf. P.0ssm,
ToRts 623 (1941) ("In practice it is seldom that children above the age of twelve have
been protected."). The general rule is that children 14 years or older are presumptively
outside the class protected by the doctrine. See cases cited note 133 sripra.
142. Courts have often derived the "over 14 year-old" rule from the analogy of the
test for determining the child's capacity for contributory negligence. But the analogy is
misleading. If the real basis of the doctrine presently being discussed is the foresee-
ability of unreasonable harm involved in the defendant's conduct, see notes 114 and 131
supra, then the discretion of the child should be relevant only to deciding the question
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the now generally discredited requirement of allurement. Older children
could hardly be "of an age when they follow a bait as mechanically as a fish."
The inability of trespassing children to appreciate the danger 143 has great
bearing on the issue of negligence. People usually avoid obvious and appre-
ciated dangers, and others may reasonably assume that they will. Surely, it
would be an intolerable burden to require a landowner "to guard every stair-
way, cellarway, retaining wall, shed, tree and open window on his premises,
so that a child cannot climb to a precipitous place and fall off.
'" 14 4 Yet some
" dangers may be so great and so likely to be encountered, inadvertently perhaps,
that it is not reasonable to assume that the knowing child will avoid them. 140
Thus it may be negligent to have high-tension wires 140 or explosives 14
of whether or not, in the light of that discretion, harm was unreasonably foreseeable. And
it is by now a commonplace that a defendant will be required to foresee the negligent
conduct of others whenever it is, in fact, foreseeable. Of course, even if the child is held
to be within the attractive nuisance doctrine, the question of his contributory negligence,
in the light of all relevant circumstances, will have to be decided. But that question is
different from the one of whether or not the protection of the attractive nuisance doc-
trine should be available to him. See Note, 25 Ky. L.J. 277 (1937); note 145 inlra.
143. This factor was determinative in Phipps v. Mitze, 116 Colo. 288, 180 P.2d 233
(1947); Esquibel v. Denver, 112 Colo. 546, 151 P.2d 757 (1944); Harriman v. Town of
Afton, 225 Iowa 659, 281 N.W. 183 (1938); Bagby v. Kansas City, 338 Mo. 771, 92
S.W.2d 142 (1936). See RFSTATniENT, TORTS § 339, comment c (1934). Cf. Vincent v.
Barnhill, 203 Miss. 740, 34 So.2d 363 (1948); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Powers, 206
Okla. 322, 243 P.2d 688 (1952). See also notes 128-34 supra.
144. Kayser v. Lindell, 73 Minn. 123, 126, 75 N.W. 1038, 1039 (1898).
145. Such a situation might arise if a child were pushed into the danger, or if he
tried to rescue a playmate who was foreseeably threatened by a dangerous condition for
which defendant was responsible. See Pierce v. United Gas & Electric Co., 161 Cal, 176,
118 Pac. 700 (1911). Cf. Atlanta & W.P.R.R. v. Green, 246 Fed. 676 (5th Cir. 1917),
and Judge Weaver's remarks in Edgington v. Burlington, C.R. & N. Ry., 116 Iowa 410,
434-5, 90 N.W. 95, 104 (1902).
The question of the child's contributory negligence is a separate problem which must
be carefully distinguished from that of the land occupier's duty. See pp. 152, 158, 167 supra.
Unfortunately the issues are often confused. See note 142 supra. Where contributory
negligence bars recovery anyway, the confusion does not affect the result. But in cases
in which plaintiff may not be contributorily negligent, it would be important to keep the
issues distinct.
146. As in the Pierce and Green cases, mrpra note 145, and the cases cited note 68
supra. But see Olson v. Ottertail Power Co., 65 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1933) (majority
directed defendant's verdict because 7 year-old plaintiff appreciated danger of live wires).
147. Courts have generally regarded explosives as within the attractive nuisance doc-
trine. See, e.g., Mattson v. Minn. & N.W.R.R., 95 Minn. 477, 104 N.W. 443 (1905);
Vills v. City of Cloquet, 119 Minn. 277, 138 N.W. 33 (1912) ; Verran v. Town of Greene-
ville, 4 Tenn. App. 422 (1927). They have, however, generally refused to apply the doc-
trine in cases where the child realized the danger involved. E.g., Hutchens v. Nat. Fire-
works Dist. Co., 7 Tenn. App. 575 (1928); Stephens v. Blackwood Lumber Co., 191
N.C. 23, 131 S.E. 314 (1926) ; Luttrell v. Carolina Mineral Co., 220 N.C. 782, 18 S,E.2d
412 (1942). Cf. Buckeye Irrigation Co. v. Askren, 45 Ariz. 566, 46 P.2d 1068 (1935);
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Slatton, 193 Ark. 356, 100 S.W.2d 86 (1936); Vaughan v4 In-
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exposed and within easy reach of a place which trespassers are known to fre-
quent.
148
It is often said that the condition must be highly dangerous. 1 0 The degree
of its danger, of course, bears on negligence.' O Requiring a probability of
serious harm is simply one way to weight the scales to shield the landowner.''
To the extent that such a formula is used in instructions to the jury, its effect
is precatory and imponderable. ' -5 2 But it has also served as an invitation to
courts to exercise greater control over juries here than they do in negligence
dustrial Silica Corp., 140 Ohio St. 17, 42 N.E.2d 156 (1942). Many of these cases in-
volve the same confusion between duty and contributory negligence suggested in note 142
supra; in other cases the statements of the requirement are clearly obiter dicta; in still
others the decisions rest on theories of proximate cause which are of questionable validity.
See James, supra note 39, at 289-93; James & Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE LJ. 761
(1951).
Perhaps the courts in some of these cases mitigated the harsh implications of mistalen
theory by adding still a further clement of confusion: letting a jury find that plaintiff
failed to appreciate a danger which he manifestly did appreciate. E.g., Buckeye Irriga-
tion Co. v. Askren, supra, at 577, 46 P.2d at 1072 ("Vhfile the evidence and circum-
stances indicate the decedent [13 year-old boy] did realize and appreciate the danger to
which he was exposing himself, we cannot say that persons of equal intelligence and
honesty may not reasonably draw a contrary conclusion, as the court in this case did.").
148. Compare the tendency, found often in the la, of torts, to minimize defenses as
the probability of injury from defendant's conduct increases. See, e.g., James, Co:tribu-
tory Neglige;ce, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953).
149. See Massie v. Copeland, 149 Tex. 319, 324-5, 233 SAW.2d 449, 452 (1950) ; R.-i
STATE BxrT, ToTs § 339, comment b (1934).
The courts usually speak of refusing to impose liability where the condition is not
"inherently dangerous," e.g., Jarvis v. Howard, 310 Ky. 38, 219 S.W2d 958 (1949) (un-
railed ramp) ; Gear v. General Ins. Co., 263 Wise. 261, 57 NA.2d 340 (1953) (automo-
bile); Coffey v. Oscar Mayer & Co., 252 Wise. 473, 32 N.V.2d 235 (1943) (ice truck);
or where it is not "per se' dangerous, e.g., Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App.
1951) (automobile); Brown v. Rosenfield's, Inc., 42 So.2d q85 (La. App. 1949) (escala-
tor in department store) ; Peters v. Town of Ruston, 167 So. 491 (La. App. 1936) (arti-
ficial lake with no unusual features) ; Fitzpatrick v. Rose Donahue Realty Co., 151 Minn.
128, 186 N.W. 141 (1922) (barrel of slaked lime) ; Shock v. Ringling Bros., 5 Wash. 2d
599, 105 P.2d 838 (1940) (circus wagon; but unloading it might be a "per se" dangerous
condition). Compare Hull v. Gillioz, 344 Mo. 1227, 130 S.W2d 623 (1939) (an object
may be "inherently dangerous" either because of danger inhering in the instrumentality
itself or in the condition in which it was left; thus very heavy beams piled in unstable
way may be attractive nuisance), with Emery v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 494, 148 S.W2d
479 (1941) (pile of cross ties not inherently dangerous since the danger, if any, arising
therefrom would be from the negligent manner in which they were piled.).
150. See James, supra note 39, at 282-3.
151. Bauer, The Degree of Danger and the Degree of Difflcuty of Rcmuoal of the
Danger as Factors in "Attractive Nvisance" Cases, 18 Muni. L. R v. 523 (1934). See
also Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 339, 91 N.W. 880 (1902).
152. See James, Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 YuMX UJ. C67,
6S0-5 (1949).
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cases generally. They have often done this by making categories of objects
and conditions which are not to be classed as "attractive nuisances." 163 This
amounts to the prescription of fixed standards of conduct in a way that is
being progressively abandoned in accident law. 15 4 The stronger hold of such
standards here is probably a vestigial trace of the landowner's special privi-
leges, not destined to endure long.1 m5
It is sometimes said that the condition must be unusual.'"0 If, in fact, it is
unusual, this may have some tendency to show that it was more likely to
attract, 5 7 and that its danger was less likely to be understood. 58 If the con-
dition is not unusual, that may have some tendency to show that it was not
unreasonably dangerous.' 50 But again, this should be treated as simply one
of many variable factors to be weighed on the issue of negligence.'0 " Un-
doubtedly, many usual conditions will fall short of negligence in particular
153. See cases cited notes 27 (simulated natural conditions), 118 (water cases), 119
(fire cases), 120 (high places), and 148 (not inherently or "per se" dangerous) supra.
However, few if any of these categories are as absolutely rigid as the statements in the
cases seem to suggest. Compare Peers v. Pierre, 366 111. App. 134, 83 N.E.2d 20 (1948)
(pond containing sticks with which children were in the habit of "playing boats" held not
to be attractive nuisance), with Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d
79 (1949) (pond cbntaining sticks with which children were in the habit of "playing
boats" held to be an attractive nuisance). See also annotations cited note 106 subpra; 38
Am. Jua., Negligence § 150 (1941); 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 29(12) (1950).
154. Green, supra note 4, at 495-6; James & Sigerson, Particularizing Standards of
Conduct in Negligence Trials, 5 VAND. L. REv. 697, 709-14 (1952).
155. Green, supra note 4, at 522.
156. Esquibel v. Denver, 112 Colo. 546, 151. P.2d 757 (1944). That the condition
was not unusual was a factor in denying liability in Wood v. Consumers Co., 334
Ill. App. 530, 79 N.E.2d 826 (1948) (pond) ; Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Beers, 185 Okla.
331, 91 P.2d 777 (1939) (pumping machinery in oil country); Payne v. Utah-Idaho
Sugar Co., 62 Utah 598, 221 Pac. 568 (1923) (sugar beet dump) ; Clark v. Bremerton,
1 Wash.2d 689, 97 P2d 112 (1939) (kerosene flares to light highway excavations).
157. See cases cited notes 117-122 supra.
158. See, e.g., Wood v. Consumers Co., supra note 156. And see Note, 8 A.L.R.2d
1254, 1274-6, 1293-6 (1949).
159. See, e.g., Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896) (pond) ; Dahl v.
Valley Dredging Co., 125 Minn. 90, 145 N.W. 796 (1914) (small quantity of naptha in
container); Fitzpatrick v. Rose Donahue Realty Co., 151 Minn. 128, 186 N.W. 141
(1922) (slaked lime); Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Beers, 185 Okla. 331, 91 P.2d 777
(1939) (pumping machinery in oil country).
160. "The owner of a thing dangerous and attractive to children is not always and
universally liable for an injury to a child tempted by the attraction. His liability bears a
relation to the character of the thing, whether natural or common, or artificial and un-
common, to the comparative ease or difficulty of preventing the danger without destroying
or impairing the usefulness of the thing, and in short to the reasonableness and propriety
of his own conduct, in view of all surrounding circumstances and conditions." Peters v,
Bowman, supra note 159, at 356. See also Hudson, supra note 94, at 852.
On the relevance of what is customary to the issue of due care, see James & Sigerson,
supra note 154, at 709-14 (1952).
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cases as a matter of law, 1" but there should be no rule of thumb requirement
that a condition be unusual.
6 2
The fourth requirement for recovery is that there must have been a reason-
ably feasible way to remove the danger. 163 This of course is a universal re-
quirement in negligence law which balances the practicability and cost to
the defendant of effective precautions against the probability and gravity of
harm to plaintiff.0 4 But here again there has been some excess of caution.
The Restatement, for instance, would not allow recovery unless "the utility
to the possessor of maintaining the condition [was] slight as compared to
the risk to young children involved therein."1u 1 If this means anything beyond
the usual formula, which refuses to require precautions that are unreasonable
in the light of foreseeable danger, 6 then it seems hard to justify. As one
161. See, e.g., Kayser v. Lindell, 73 Minn. 123, 126, 75 NAV. 1033, 1039 (1893) (7-
foot retaining wall not attractive nuisance). Also see cases cited notes 126-8 su4pra and
accompanying text; note 162 infra.
162. This is especially true since "unusual" is not a word of art. Thus what is un-
usual in one jurisdiction may not be unusual in another jurisdiction. And what is usual
at one period may be unusual at another period within the same jurisdiction. E.g., are
the ordinary poles used by electric light, telephone, and telegraph companies "unusual"
enough to be attractive nuisances? Compare Salt River Valley Ass'n v. Compton, 40
Ariz. 22, 11 P.2d 839 (1932) (yes), with Te.xas-Louisiana Power Co. v. Bihil, 65 S.W2d
672 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (no). Junk yards? Ceom'are Thomas v. Anthony, 261 Ill.
288, 103 N.E. 974 (1913) (yes), with Kelley v. First Bank & Trust Co., 256 I11. App.
439 (1930) (no).
Recovery has been allowed under the attractive nuisance doctrine in cases involving
the following instrumentalities: a sidewalk newsstand, Harrison v. Chicago, 303 Ill. App.
263, 31 N.E.2d 359 (1941) ; a fire escape, Perrin v. Rainwater, 186 S.C. 181, 195 S.E.
283 (1938); block and tackle, Webster v. Ruick Ice Cream Co., 156 Wisc. 576, 146 N.W.
815 (1914); and a pile of steel girders, Snare & Triest Co. v. Friedman, 169 Fed. 1 (3d
Cir. 1909). But cf. Friedman v. Snare & Triest Co., 71 N.J.L. 605, 61 At. 401 (1905)
(recovery denied in state court on same facts). It is difficult to see how these instrumen-
talities can be held, as a matter of law, to be more unusual than the following instrumen-
talities to which the attractive nuisance doctrine has been held inapplicable: meat grind-
ing machine, Favaro v. Jacobucci, 239 Ill. App. 533 (1926); cooper's buckets in stone
quarry, Callahan Construction Co. v. Hughes, 348 Mo. 1209, 159 S.Wr.2d 251 (1941); a
parked tractor, Rapczynski v. W. T. Cowan Inc., 13S Pa. Super. 392 10 A.2d 810
(1940) ; and a pond in which there were 13-inch sticks with which children were in the
habit of "playing boats,' Peers v. Pierre, 336 111. App. 134, 83 N.E.2d 20 (1948).
If the term "unusual instrumentalities" is to be used, it should mean no more than
"instrumentalities which create an unreasonable risk of harm under all the circumstances."
See sources cited notes 114, 131, 146-7 and 160 supra. An analysis of the cases suggests
most of them actually hold no more than this.
163. "The contrivance must be... capable of being rendered safe with ease without
destroying its usefulness ... . Morse v. Douglas, 107 Cal. App. 196, 201, 290 Pac. 465,
467 (1930). See also 38 Ami. Ju., Negligence § 147 (1941); 65 CJ.S., Negligence
§29(8) (1950).
164. James, supra note 39, at 280-6.
165. REsTATm=ExT, ToRTs § 339(d) (1934) (emphasis added).
166. See Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Krayenbuhl, 65 Neb. 839, 91 N.W. SO (1902);
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author has put it: "To require the removal of a great danger only in those
cases in which such removal can be accomplished 'with slight expense and little
inconvenience '167 would seem somewhat extreme, for great dangers may ren-
der necessary great care, involving more than slight expense and little incon-
venience."168
Inspection is one of the commonest precautions which the duty of care
may require a defendant to take for the removal of danger. But, it has been
said that the occupier of land owes no duty of inspection to discover con-
ditions dangerous to trespassing children. 16 9 Such a rule would, of course,
be a logical enough corollary of the notion that landowners owed no duty of
care to trespassers. But if the general principles of negligence are to be sub-
stituted for the older special immunities, then any exemption from a duty to
inspect, as a matter of law in all cases, is either a vestige of the older prin-
ciple which is out of place under the newer one, or the erection of a fixed
standard of conduct that relieves one class of defendants from one of the
precautions commonly incidental to the exercise of ordinary care 170 Here,
as elsewhere, in any given case, inspection may not be feasible or may seem
uncalled for; or an inspection which would have disclosed the particular con-
dition may be unreasonably burdensome. And under general principles, if
the danger was neither known in fact nor discoverable by reasonable inspec-
tion, the occupier cannot be held. 1 71 There is no reason in logic or policy for
extending the exemption further.
7 2
Both the attractive nuisance doctrine and the Restatement view have been
invoked to impose liability where a trespassing child removes a dangerous
thing, e.g., dynamite caps, from defendant's land and someone else is injured
off the land by the dangerous instrumentality.17 3 But neither notion should
Fisher v. Burrell, 116 Ore. 317, 241 Pac. 40 (1925) ; Morrison v. Phelps Stone Co., 203
Mo. App. 142, 219 S.W. 393 (1920). See note 160 supra.
167. Bauer, supra note 151, here quotes from Brown v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 135
Ky. 798, 807, 123 S.W. 298, 301 (1909).
168. Bauer, supra note 151, at 538.
169. See, e.g., Eldredge, supra note 75, at 51-2.
170. See HARPER, LAW OF TORTS 176 (1933).
17L Thus, even where the duty to inspect is admittedly owed (e.g., to invitees), lia-
bility is not imposed for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition which would not
have been disclosed by a reasonably careful inspection even though no such inspection
has been made. See Miller v. Hickey, 368 Pa. 317, 324, 81 A.2d 910, 914 (1951). See
also American District Tel. Co. v. Kittelson, 179 F.2d 946 (8th Cir. 1950); Lundin v.
Shumate's Pharmacy, Inc., 98 Cal. App. 2d 817, 221 P.2d 260 (1950) ; Gowing v. Henry
Field Co., 225 Iowa 729, 281 N.W. 281 (1938) ; Hartman v. Miller, 143 Pa. Super. 143,
17 A.2d 652 (1940).
172. Perhaps the recent case of Rush v. Plains Twp., 371 Pa. 117, 89 A.2d 200
(1952), goes no farther than this in exonerating the landowne- of a duty of inspection
toward child trespassers. In this case the court found no evidence of either knowledge
or constructive notice, see note 75 supra, which suggests that defendant might have been
under a duty of reasonable care to acquire knowledge.
173. E.g., Lone Star Gas Co. v. Parsons, 159 Okla. 52, 14 P.2d 369 (1932). Cf. Katz
v. Helbing, 205 Cal. 629, 271 Pac. 1062 (1928).
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be necessary; their only office is to avoid the occupier's traditional immunity
when plaintiff is a trespasser. This immunity is out of place since plaintiff
here is not a trespasser. Lacking immunity, defendant owes plaintiff a duty
to refrain from conduct involving unreasonable likelihood of harm to him. If
the intermeddling by trespassing children is foreseeable,'74 it is negligent to
leave the dangerous thing accessible to them. Such foreseeability also extends
the scope of risk to people within the limits to which the danger might fore-
seeably be carried.175 The question of a duty to the trespasser should not arise
as such. Yet the lack of that duty is sometimes tied up with the notion that
a possessor of land need not anticipate a trespass, and if this artificial limita-
tion on foreseeability is carried over to the present situation, it will stand in
the way of a duty to plaintiff.176 However, the whole modem tendency in our
Of course such cases also arise in states which reject both the attractive nuisance
and Restatement doctrines. See, e.g., Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., 2,0 N.Y. 110, 19
N.E2d 981 (1939) (no liability since attractive nuisance doctrine rejected in New Yorl,
gasoline is not an "inherently dangerous" material, and the children's actions were not
reasonably foreseeable) ; Kingsland v. Erie Co. Agr. Soc., 293 N.Y. 469, 84 N.E-2d 3
(1949) (liability because "aerial bomb fireworks" are inherently dangerous and the chil-
dren's trespass was reasonably foreseeable) ; Martino v. Rotundi, 91 NV. Va. 43, 113 S.E.
760 (1922) (no liability since children's trespass is an intervening cause which prevents
the landowner's negligence, if any, from being a proximate cause of the plaintiff's in-
juries). As to the present status of the attractive nuisance doctrine in West Virginia, see
Tiller v. Baisden, 128 IV. Va. 126, 35 S.E2d 728 (1945) ; Beatty, The Attractive ANtui-
sance Doctrine in the Virginas, 10 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 20 (1953).
174. See Lone Star Gas Co. v. Parsons, supra note 173, at 57, 14 P2d at 372
Although the majority of the court refused to impose liability in the 3Morse case,
supra note 173, on several grounds, they apparently felt it necessary to add that "the fact
that a pail containing dirt)' gasoline, left to accumulate the drippings of a faucet, would
lead boys to steal the pail and throw the contents at a fire already burning in the public
street, into which fire would trip a boy as he attempted to run by and join the others,
is a chain of events containing so many new and unexpected causes that the result was
not 'within the range of reasonable expectation!" Id. at 118, 19 N.E.2d at 934. And
Lehman, J., in his dissenting opinion, id. at 123, 19 N.E.2d at 987, argued that "the test of
responsibility for injury caused by an act or neglect is always whether a reasonably pru-
dent person would anticipate that from that particular act or neglect injury to another
might follow. Where human intervention by third parties, whether by lawful or wrong-
ful act, may be foreseen by the prudent, such intervention must be taken into account."
175. "The degree of care required is commensurate with the risk involved, depnding
upon such circumstances as the 'dangerous character of the material' and its accessibility
to others, particularly children whose presence should have been anticipated regardless of
whether or not they are trespassers. The issue of proximate cause [should be] left to the
jury.... 'Where harmful consequences are brought about by intervening and independent
forces, the operation of which 2night have beea reasonably forese$", there is no break in
the chain of causation of such character as to relieve the actor from liability."' Kings-
land v. Erie Co. Agr. Soc., 293 N.Y. 409, 423-4, S4 N.E.2d 3S, 45 (1949). See also
James, Scope of Dzuty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 778. 7S6-3l0 (1953).
176. See Martino v. Rotundi, 91 W. Va. 432, 4S4-5, 113 S.E. 760, 762 (1922).
Even when unreasonable risk of harm is foreseeable, three artificial limitations on lia-
bility are sometimes imposed where the harm is catised to someone off the premises by a
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Courts are far readier to invoke the duty of care and the concept of negli-
gence where they find active conduct than where they find a mere condition
of the premises.1 78 Any arrangement of the premises by the occupier may be
regarded as affirmative activity.170 But there is a difference between building
a bridge, then failing to inspect and repair it and to warn of its deteriorated
condition, on the one hand, and, on the other, hitting or shooting a trespasser
or even running a vehicle against him because of the driver's failure to look
out or to warn. °80 In the first case the affirmative act occurred long before
the trespass; in the others there was activity by the occupier after the tres-
pass had commenced. There may be some validity in a distinction based on
this matter of relative timing. As Jeremiah Smith put it in a leading article:
"The first case is that of a known, present and immediate danger,
one which is imminent and reasonably certain to result in harm,
unless the owner then and there does, or omits to do, some act, the
dangerous instrumentality carried from the premises by a child trespasser. (a) Those states
which do not recognize the attractive nuisance doctrine sometimes refuse to impose liability
as a result of what is regarded as the compulsion of logic. See, e.g., Morse v. Buffalo Tank
Corp., 280 N.Y. 110, 117, 19 N.E.2d 981, 984 (1939) ("If the act of the landowner on his
own premises would not render him liable to a trespasser or licensee . . . [his act can]
not be transformed into negligence through [the] trespass and stealing of [his] material
and transportation away from the premises."). (b) Those states which do not recognize
the attractive nuisance doctrine sometimes refuse to impose liability where the instru-
mentality taken is not "inherently dangerous." Compare Kingsland v. Erie Co. Agr. Soc.,
298 N.Y. 409, 84 N.E.2d 38 (1949) (aerial bomb fireworks inherently dangerous; lia-
bility imposed), uith Morse v. Buffalo Tank Corp., supra (gasoline not inherently dan-
gerous; no liability). (c) Even a state which accepts the attractive nuisance doctrine
may refuse to impose liability when the trespassing child realized the danger involved
in the instrumentality carried from the property. See cases cited note 147 supra. All
three limitations should be removed.
177. See, e.g., Katz v. Helbing, 205 Cal. 629, 271 Pac. 1062 (1928); Mazzocchi v.
Seay, 126 W. Va. 490, 29 S.E.2d 12 (1944) (parents will be held liable for negligence
if plaintiff can prove that they should reasonably have foreseen that their 4% year-old
child would injure someone with the air rifle and ammunition they gave him). See also
James, supra note 39, at 289-93; Note, 22 N.C.L. Rzv. 333 (1944).
178. Smith, siupra note 38, at 363-6.
179. See note 131 sitpra. Cf. Green, supra note 4, at 517-20.
180. "There is a broad difference between the case of a trespasser's meeting with an
injury by reason of the dangerous condition of the defendant's premises and that of an
injury caused by the defendant's active intervention." Mitchell v. Boston & M.R.R., 68
N.H. 96, 118, 34 Atl. 674, 677 (1894). See BOHLEN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 49-52, 174-5,
181-201; Peaslee, Duty to Seen Trespassers, 27 HARV. L. Ray. 403, 411 n.17 (1914). Cf.
Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespassers, 12 TEaxp. L.Q. 32, 47 (1937). Of course, if the
condition is consciously prepared for the trespasser, the significance of the difference dis-
appears. See p. 154-6 supra.
[Vol. 63 :144
TORT LIABILITY
doing or omitting of which would avoid the danger. In the second
case the danger may be said to exist chiefly in anticipation. It de-
pends on the course of future events, upon circumstances as yet
unknown and fortuitous. In the first case the duty imposed upon
the landowner involves simply a temporary, generally only a momen-
tary, interruption of his user.... In the second case the duty sought
to be established is to guard against future dangers. It must fre-
quently involve permanent changes in the mode of user, sometimes
necessitating such expense and trouble as would be practically pro-
hibitive of certain modes of user, and in some cases compelling the
abandonment of all profitable use.
' 18'
This is a fair generalization, but it does not operate uniformly. Some
dangerous conditions of the premises are plain to be seen by the occupier,
very serious, and simple and cheap to remedy; some active operations are
complicated so that the burden of constant lookout, for instance, would be
a severe one.'8 2 The differences which Jeremiah Smith pointed out are
differences in degree which vary infinitely with the circumstances. The rela-
tive point in time when the occupier's affirmative activity took place is only
one among these varying circumstances, and is entitled to great weight in
some cases and little in others.8 3 Since the theory of negligence accommo-
dates these differences with a flexibility adapted to such infinite variety, it
would seem preferable to employ it whenever unreasonable probability of
harm affords the basis for a duty of care without making hard and fast
distinctions between condition of premises and active intervention. 1s Here,
as in this field generally, the trend is towards that result, but the old classi-
fications have become so much a part of conventional legal reasoning that
a liberal result may often be reached more readily by manipulating the older
181. Smith, supra note 38, at 364-5, quoted with approval in Hobbs v. G. \V. Blanchard
& Sons Co., 75 N.H. 73,75-6,70 Atl. 1082, 1034 (1908).
182. Consider the case of the steam locomotive-until recently so common. The long
boiler in front of the cab makes a blind spot along the tracks for as much as 150 feet in
front of the locomotive, and virtually prevents the engineer from seeing anything to the
left for a very long distance ahead. Moreover the exigencies of railroading required the
fireman often to be away from his seat, down "on deck" firing; if any effective lookout
to the left were to be maintained at such times, that would mean the expense of an extra
man in the cab.
1883. E.g., in Bottum's Adm'r v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 79 At. 85S (1911), the defendant
knew that an uncovered bulkhead opening into a conduit carrying fast-flowing water
was dangerous and attractive to children who commonly resorted to the area for amuse-
ment. The bulkhead was located near a main street, and a private school was located
nearby. The court admitted that "this open unguarded bulkhead, located as it vws, -was a
serious menace to the children of the community ... likely to cause accidents of such
dire consequences." Id. at 372, 79 Atl. at 859. It seems incredible to argue that the duty
to cover or guard the bulkhead would have involved "such expense and trouble as would
be practically prohibitive of certain modes of user." Yet the court refused liability; it
found "a heavy moral obligation ... to cover or guard it" but no legal duty to prevent
disaster. Ibid.
184. See note 131 supra. See also Green, supra note 4, at 517-20.
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concepts than by rejecting them. This is particularly true in borderline situa-
tions where defendant's conduct may, without too much violence to logic, be
regarded as intervention. 80
In most of the cases heretofore discussed, it was assumed that the condition
of the premises and the act that caused it both antedated the trespass. Where
they do not do so, borderline situations are presented. After a trespasser is
known to be in the storeroom, an elevator may be moved without closing the
gate. Few courts would hesitate to call the leaving of the unguarded shaft
active intervention, though it simply changes a condition of the premises.18 0
A closer case is presented where the condition of the premises is changed
before this visit of the trespasser (or before it becomes known) but after
the possessor knows facts that render the trespass likely. To be sure the
danger in such a case, as Smith put it, "depends" in part "on the course of
future events, upon circumstances as yet unknown and fortuitous." Yet the
known facts point up the danger a great deal more than would the vague
realization that people do occasionally trespass almost everywhere. Where the
trespass is likely enough and the facts indicating that likelihood have been
brought home to the occupier, courts are becoming increasingly willing to
treat a change in the condition of the premises as active intervention, 187
There are other borderline situations in which courts are becoming in-
creasingly willing to characterize equivocal conduct as misfeasance rather
than nonfeasance. In 1897, the New Hampshire Court declared that:
"Danger from machinery in motion in the ordinary course of busi-
ness cannot -be distinguished from that arising from a well, pit, open
scuttle, or other stationary object. The movement of the works is
part of the regular and normal condition of the premises."' 88
Thirty years later the same court was willing to regard the failure to stop
moving machinery as active misconduct towards a seen trespasser. 80 It may
185. See McCaffrey v. Concord Electric Co., 80 N.H. 45, 49, 114 Atl. 395, 397 (1921)
(dissenting opinion).
186. Thus, in Hobbs v. G. W. Blanchard & Sons Co., 74 N.H. 116, 65 At. 382
(1906), defendant's placing dynamite where a child trespasser, whose presence was known,
could come in contact with it, was regarded as active intervention.
187. Hobbs v. G. W. Blanchard & Sons Co., supra note 186; Strang v. South Jersey
Broadcasting Co., 9 N.J. 38, 86 A.2d 777 (1951); cf. Lowery v. Walker, [1911] A.C. 10.
See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 334-7 (1934).
Courts have long imposed a duty on occupiers of land which licensees are accustomed
to cross, to guard against injuries in consequence of changes in the condition of the
premises. See, e.g., Notes, 13 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1126 (1908); 20 A.L.R. 202 (1922). And
courts have often been ready enough to find that a "trespasser" was a "licensee," when-
ever that was thought to be the only way of raising a duty of care towards trespassers
whose presence was exceedingly likely. See Eldredge, supra note 180, at 34-8. See also
pp. 180-2 infra.
188. Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 262, 44 Atl. 809, 811 (1898).
189. Castonguay v. Acme Knitting Machine & Needle Co., 83 N.H. 1, 136 Atl. 702
(1927). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 338 (1934).
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also be active misconduct to direct a trespasser to take a dangerous route
without warning him of lurking dangers in the premises. 10 0
Given active intervention, the question then arises what the occupier's
duties are with respect to this intervention. A good many of the earlier cases
imposed no duty on the occupier except to refrain from intentional injury.
Probably all states, however, have expanded this to include at least a duty
to refrain from wanton or wilful misconduct towards a trespasser whose
presence is known.191 Some states have stopped at this point,102 but many
of those which purport to do so have added a gloss that to be actively negli-
gent in the presence of a perceived trespasser amounts to wantonness.Ie 3 This
is only a more or less indirect way of requiring the occupier to conduct him-
self with ordinary care towards a trespasser once the latter's presence has
become known.'0 4 Under one form or another, this is in substance the rule
in the vast majority of American jurisdictions' 0 5
Under this rule the presence of the trespasser becomes "perceived" if de-
fendant actually knows that a person or people are present, whether or not
he recognizes that plaintiff is a trespasser.013 Thus if defendant sees a crowd
of people, the duty of care is owed to all of them, as people, whether a tres-
passer is among them or not.y M oreover, if defendant perceives facts or
190. Skladzien v. Sutherland Building & Construction Co., 101 Conn. 340, 125 At.
614 (1924). But cf. Lackat v. Lutz, 94 Ky. 2W7, 22 SAV. 218 (1S93), showing how this
situation can be complicated by problems of scope of authority and contributory negli-
gence.
191. See BoHLEN-, STUDIES L THE LAW OF TORTS 164 n.15 (1926).
192. E.g., Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Priest, 117 Ga. 767, 771-2, 45 S.E. 35, 37
(1903); McIntyre v. Converse, 238 Mass. 592, 594, 131 N.E. 193, 199 (1921). See
BoHLEx, op. cit. supra note 191, at 165; Green, supra note 4, at 503; Peaslee, supra note
180, at 411; Note, 30 Y.L LJ. 201 (1920).
193. E.g., Reagan v. Reading Co., 126 Pa. Super. 175, 179, 190 Ad. 412, 414 (1937);
Huff v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 48 W. Va. 45, 48, 35 S.E. 896, 867 (1900) ("The only
duty the company owed him was not to Wantonly or wilfully injure him. Had its em-
ployees seen him in time to save him, it would have been their duty to use ordinary care
do to so."). See also BoHLEN, op. cit. supra note 191, at 167-8; Peaslee, supra note 180,
at 411.
194. See Eldredge, supra note 180, at 43. It should be noted that liability may be
imposed under the "wanton or wilful" formula for conduct which is merely inadvertent
or the result of nervousness. See analysis of the intent factor in Peaslee, sipra note 180,
at 412-16.
195. See, e.g., BoHLE, op. cit. supra note 191, at 164-70; Eldredge, supra note 180;
Green, supra note 4, at 503; Peaslee, supra note ISO; REsTATEME_,NT, Tonis § 336 (1934).
Most courts have discarded the "wilful or vanton" formula entirely and have clearly
stated that a duty of due care is owed to perceived trespassers. See, e.g., Herrick v. Wixon,
121 Mich. 384, 388, SO N.W. 117, 118, 81 N.W. 333 (1899); 33 A n. Jun., Negligence
§ 111 (1941) ; 65 C.J.S., Negligence § 24(i) (1950).
196. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Metzner, 150 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1945) ; Herric: v.
Wixon, supra note 195; cf. Carney v. Concord St. Ry., 72 N.H. 364, 57 At. 21S (1903).
197. Cf. RFSTATE-ENT, ToRTs § 336, comment c (1934) ("The Mossessor's duty to
exercise reasonable care in conducting his activities so as to avoid causing bodily harm
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objects which strongly suggest the presence of human beings, e.g., an object
on the track which might be a man or a pile of clothes, he is bound to regulate
his dangerous activities with that likelihood in view. 198 Proof that defendant,
or its employees, saw the trespasser may be made circumstantially, even over
a direct denial.199 Thus it may be shown that defendant responded to plain-
tiff's presence, e.g., by taking an inadequate precaution to avoid him ;2o0 that
plaintiff was in plain sight and clearly visible to one who was looking carefully
ahead, as defendant said he was, and so on. But the quest here is for actual
knowledge, and the chance to see is relevant only to the extent that it indi-
cates defendant did in fact see.
201
Where the trespasser's presence is not perceived, the cases take one of
three attitudes. Some courts absolve the occupier of any duty towards the
trespasser, even with respect to affirmative activities.20 2 This attitude was
once quite common, but has steadily been losing ground.20 3 At the other
extreme, a very few courts have imposed on the occupier whose activities are
highly dangerous, e.g., railroading, the duty of care towards trespassers at
any place which is exposed to the activity.204 Taking a middle position, the
to a trespasser whose presence is known to him, is based upon his knowledge of the
presence of the trespasser as a man and not as a trespasser.").
198. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Metzner, 150 F.2d 206, 208 (6th Cir. 1945); RE-
STATEwENT, TORTS §336, comment b (1934); cf. Frederick v. Philadelphia R. T. Co.,
337 Pa. 136, 10 A.2d 576 (1940). But cf. Sorey v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 17 La. App. 538,
136 So. 155 (1931) ; Kansas, Okla. & Gulf Ry. v. Wickliffe, 201 Okla. 129, 202 P.2d 423
(1948). See also Note, 70 A.L.R. 1116 (1931).
In this connection, it should be -remembered that "activities" may include a change in
the condition of the premise, a continuing movement of machinery, or conduct likely to
lead a trespasser to encounter a dangerous condition of the premises.
199. See, e.g., Moore v. Kurn, 108 F.2d 906 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Arnold v. Owens, 78
F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1935) ; Grover v. Webster City, 222 Iowa 849, 270 N.W. 329 (1936).
200. See, e.g., Carney v. Concord St. Ry., 72 N.H. 364, 57 Atl. 218 (1903) (ringing
of bell).
201. See, e.g., Central of Georgia Ry. v. Sharpe, 83 Ga. App. 12, 19, 62 S.E.2d 427,
432 (1950) ; Woodward Iron Co. v. Goolsby, 242 Ala. 327, 6 So.2d 11 (1942) ; Jackson
v. Penn. R.R., 176 Md. 1, 3 A.2d 719 (1939); Davies v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 370 Pa.
180, 87 A.2d 183 (1952).
The statement in the text refers to an attempt to base liability on the fact that the
trespasser was seen. It is not meant to suggest that liability may be predicated only on
such a basis. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Michigan Coal & Mining Co., 159 Mich. 308, 311-12,
123 N.W. 1122, 1123 (1909) ("The weight of authority would appear to be that after
the owner of premises is aware of the presence of a trespasser or licensee, or if in the
exercise of ordinary care he should know of their presence, he is bound to use ordinary
care to prevent injury to them arising from active negligence."). See also Carlson v.
Conn. Co., 94 Conn. 131, 108 Atl. 531 (191.9); Polston v. S. S. Kresge Co., 324 Mic. 575,
37 N.W.2d 638 (1949); Brown v. Boston & M.R.R., 73 N.H. 568, 64 At. 194 (1906).
Cf. Note, 50 MIcH. L. Rsv. 617 (1952).
202. E.g., Santora v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 211 Mass. 464, 98 N.E. 90 (1912).
203. Cf. Eldredge, supra note 180, at 44-5. See cases cited note 201 supra.
204. See, e.g., Texas & P. Ry. v. Watkins, 88 Tex. 20, 24, 29 S.W. 232, 233 (1895);
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Hammer, 34 Tex Civ. App. 354, 78 S.W. 708 (1904) ; Tillman
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Restatement 205 and a majority of courts impose such a duty where, and only
where, the likelihood of trespass at some particular point, or limited locality,
on defendant's premises is considerable.200 Where, for instance trespassers
have beaten a path across railroad tracks near a village, the railroad crews
must use reasonable care, e.g., by lookout, warning, and the like, in operat-
mng trains at that point.20 7 Some courts have tried to work out rules to govern
both the degree of concentration and extent of trespassing which must exist
before they will apply the present rule.20 8 But here again, as in this field
generally, it seems better to proceed on a case to case basis, appl3ing the
guiding principle of unreasonable danger under all the circumstances, rather
than attempting to erect a rigid rule from one or another of the circum-
stances.&2 09
v. Public Belt R. R. Comm., 42 So2d 88 (La. App. 1949); Thompson v. Carley, 140
F.2d 656 (Sth Cir. 1944) (duty imposed by Arkansas statute); Gordon v. Ten. Cent.
Ry., 167 Tenn. 302, 69 S.W.2d 611 (1934) (same: Tennessee statute). The rule is re-
jected in a majority of jurisdictions. See Note, 22 ST. Jon.;'s L. R.v. 118, 123-4 (1947).
205. REsTATE I~F T, ToRTs § 334 (1934).
206. See, e.g., Carlson v. Conn. Co., 94 Conn. 131, 103 Atl. 531 (1919); Tice v.
Central of Georgia R.R., 25 Ga. App. 346, 103 S.E. 262 (1920); Arrowod v. So. Car.
& G. Extension R.R., 126 N.C. 629, 36 S.E. 151 (1900) ; Carter v. Seaboard Air Line
R.R., 114 S.C. 517, 104 S.E. 186 (1950) ; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Wolf, 76 Okla. 193.
184 Pac. 765 (1919); Johnson v. Lake Superior Terminal & Transfer Co., V5 Wise. 64,
56 N.W. 161 (1893). Recent cases are collected in Note, 167 A.L.R. 1253 (1947).
If one compares the facts in these cases with the facts in those cited note 204 supra,
it is not at all clear that the difference between this rule and the preceding one is as
great as much of the language suggests.
207. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Sullivan, 244 Ala. 485, 13 So2d 877 (1943);
Bullard v. Southern R.R., 116 Ga. 644, 43 S.E. 39 (1902) ; Clampit v. Chicago, St. P. &
K.C.R.R., 84 Iowa 71, 50 N.W. 673 (1891) ; Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mc~ary's Adm'r,
128 Ky. 408, 108 SAV. 898 (1908); Note, 167 A.L.R. 1=53 (1947).
208. This is especially true in Kentucky. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. Y. Jones,
297 Ky. 528, 180 S.V.2d 555 (1944) (use of railroad track by fewer than 150 persons
daily does not constitute them licensees to whom the operators of trains would owe a
lookout duty and the exercise of other precautionary measures for their safety); Deitz
v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R.R., 296 Ky. 279, 176 S.W.2d 699 (1943) (use of crossing
by only 75 persons daily did not impose duty of lookout and warning); Chesapeake &
Ohio Ry. v. Nipp, 125 Ky. 49, 100 S.W. 246 (1907) (duty to lookout and warn will not
be extended to rural communities although footpaths crossing track may be used by a
large number of persons each day).
209. The trespassing may be concentrated at certain times, as well as at certain places,
and if so the duty of care will vary with this circumstance also. Thus if trespassing is
extensive only during the day, it may be reasonable to omit warnings or lookout at night.
See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Smith's Adm'r, 186 Ky. 32, 216 S.W. 1063 (1919) ; Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Welsh, 272 Ky. 120, 113 S.W.2d 879 (1938).
Foreseeable trespassing may be done only in a certain manner, e.g., walking, so that
reasonable care does not require the sharper lookout needed to see a man lying dowm on
the track. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Smith's Adm'r, supra. But cf. Carlson v. Conn. Co.,
94 Conn. 131, 10S At. 531 (1919) (liability to drunk sleeping on trolley track since his
presence in that condition should have been anticipated) ; Murphy v. Wabash R.R., MZ
Mo. 56, 128 S.W. 481 (1910) (negligence may be predicated on failure to see drun:
asleep on track at point where persons often crossed track).
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The majority rule has sometimes been rationalized by calling frequent tres-
passers in limited areas "licensees. ' 210 This brings us to a discussion of the
device of reclassifying trespassers, and thereby bringing them within the pro-
tection of the duty of ordinary care under certain circumstances.
Reclassification of Trespassers
The category of technical trespasser is a wide one. It includes the burglar,
but it also includes the man or child who short-cuts across vacant land with-
out any good reason to suppose that he has the landowner's permission. So
far as the duty of care went, however, the conventional rule took little,
211
if any, account of these differences. A trespasser was simply a trespasser,
and such duty was not owed to him. From the rigidity of this concept, one
path of judicial escape has lain in a reclassification of trespassers.
Reclassification has taken one of two forms. To a very limited extent it
has meant a frank recognition of differences among trespassers, and a will-
ingness to prescribe different duties as owed to different sub-classifications.
212
Perhaps the leading case is Lowery v. Walker,213 wherein the House of
Lords recognized that if the public persisted in using a short-cut over private
land after the owner's remonstrance-which, however, he was not willing to
implement by legal action-they might be owed certain duties that ordinary
trespassers might not be.214 Such persons have been called "tolerated in-
truders. '21 5 To the extent that this new classification stresses frequency or
likelihood of presence, rather than the extent of toleration or acquiescence by
the landowner, 21 6 it tends to reflect the application of general negligence
principles in this area.
210. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Jones, 297 Ky. 528, 180 S.W.2d 555 (1944);
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Welsh, supra note 209; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Nipp, 125 Ky.
49, 100 S.W. 246 (1907). See also Chicago G.W.R.R. v. Beecher, 150 F.2d 394 (8th Cir.
1.945); Clampit v. Chicago, St. P. & K.C.R.R., 84 Iowa 71, 50 N.W. 673 (1891); Craig
v. Ft. Worth & D.C.R.R., 185 S.W. 944, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916); Delaney v. Mil-
waukee St. P.R.R., 33 Wisc. 67 (1873).
211. Dangerous acts or conditions intended to repel trespassers might be justified or
not, depending on the motive and character of the trespass. See pp. 154-6 supra.
212. For the use of this approach in reclassifying social guests, see Scheibel v. Lip-
ton, 156 Ohio St. 308, 102 N.E.2d 453 (1951).
213. [1911] A.C. 10 (H.L.).
214. The duty owed in that case was simply not to add a concealed peril to the
premises (viz., a vicious, unruly horse) without warning. Many courts in America today
would require no special reclassification of plaintiff to find such a duty to him. RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS §§ 335-6 (1934) ; see note 198 supra. But the House of Lords felt that this
reclassification relieved it from deciding whether such a duty was owed to a trespasser,
a question which it thought to be a substantial and doubtful one. Cf. Davis v. Chicago
& N.W.R.R., 58 Wisc. 646,17 N.W. 406 (1883).
215. See Bohlen, Duty of a Landomier to Those Entering His Premises of Their
Own Right, 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 142, 248 et seq. (1921) ("tolerated trespasser")
HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 92 (1933) ; PROssER, TORTS 616, 617 (1941).
216. Bohlen, supra note 215, at 251. See also, Ahnefeld v. Wabash R.R., 212 Mo.
280, 111 S.W. 95 (1908); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Rodgers, 100 Va. 324, 41 S.E. 732
[Vol. 63 :144
TORT LIABILITY
More often this reclassification has involved a continued formal acceptance
of the old categories, but with the transfer of a class of trespassers to a more
favored group. This has been done in some situations where the probability
of harm from defendant's conduct is generally so great that courts are shocked
by the practical implications of strict application of the traditional classifi-
cation. 217 This process results in fictions. The reclassification of the child
trespasser as an "invitee" under the attractive nuisance doctrine is one
example. The calling of frequent trespassers "licensees" is another. To the
pragmatist, fictions as such are not necessarily bad. They are often benign
in their effects and mark periods of transition to new rules better adapted to
changing circumstances. Possibly, fictions do this in ways that are, for subtle
reasons of social psychology, easier for people to take.
But fictions have this danger: They distort the transitional process and
often lead to inquiries that have no relevance in terms of vital policy, and to
results that are capricious and unjust in such terms. If it be assumed here,
for instance, that the vital policy is one of imposing liability for harm on un-
reasonably dangerous conduct, then neither invitation nor license, but the
probability of presence of trespassers and of harm to them is the gist of the
matter. If the fictions of "invitation" or "permission" were invoked when-
ever the likelihood of a trespasser's presence was great enough, .18 then the
fictions would not impede the practical operation of the rule, however dis-
ingenuous and distasteful the fictions might be to people who have a certain
intellectual temperament. But the trouble is that these particular fictions in-
vite misunderstanding, because they have current associations and meanings
that are not the same as probability of presence, which may exist despite the
most pointed lack of invitation or permission. It is this sort of thing that led
to the requirement of allurement as a condition of attractive nuisance. Simi-
larly, in cases of frequent localized trespassing the fiction of "license" has
occasionally led litigants and courts onto the false scent of permission or
acquiescence.
219
(1902); Green, Lando uwr v. Intruder; Intruder v. Ladndou-nr. Basis of ResponsijIfityi
in Tort, 21 Micia. L. RE'. 495 (1923) ; Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trestissers, 12 TMEtP.
L.Q. 32 (1937).
217. Cases involving injury by railroad operations to persons using a frequented path
across or along the tracks are collected in Note, 167 A.L.R. 1253 (1947). Cases involv-
ing a change in the condition of the premises which threaten users of frequented paths,
hallways and the like, are collected in Note, 20 A.L.R. 202 (1922). See also Davis v.
Chicago & N.W.R.R., 58 Wisc. 646,17 N.W. 406 (18,83).
218. See, e.g., Louisville & N.R.R. v. Smith's Adm'r, 186 Ky. 32, 37, 216 S.W. 1063,
1065 (1919) ("Whether a person is a trespasser or a licensee depends upon the number
of persons using the track at any given point.").
219. Cases almost without number, in requiring a railroad to use care towards per-
sons using a frequented path across or along the tracks, mention the railroad's acquies-
cence in that use, as well as the extent of the use, as a basis for the duty. See, e.g.,
Missouri P.R-R. v. McKinney, 189 Ark. 69, 71 S.W.2d 180 (1934) ; Georgia R. & B. Co.
v. Fuller, 6 Ga. App. 454, 65 S.E. 313 (1909); Doyle v. Portland R.L & P. Co., 71 Ore.
576, 143 Pac. 623 (1914); Smith v. Philadelphia & R.R.R., 274 Pa. 97, 117 Adt. 7&ii
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Despite occasional misleading language,220 most of the actual decisions do
turn on likelihood of presence, and this is as it should be.221 It should not
make one whit of difference that defendant tried-vigorously or otherwise-
to stop such trespassing, unless his efforts were successful enough to reduce
the actual likelihood that people would trespass in fact.222 Such efforts might
show lack of consent, but the occupier's consent is no longer determinative
on this issue.223 This does not mean that the occupier will be deprived of the
right of exclusive possession. He may still exclude the trespasser either by
reasonable force or by legal action backed by the force of society. But it does
mean that the right of exclusive possession does not carry with it the privi-
lege to engage in conduct fraught with unreasonable probability of harm to
the lives and limbs of people merely because there is no consent to their presence.
(1922) ; cases cited in Note, 167 A.L.R. 1253 (1947), which note also speaks in terms of
"acquiescence" in stating the general rule. Id. at 1256. In most cases, however, there
is no issue as to acquiescence, and it is allowed to be inferred from the extensive, open,
and notorious use.
A few decisions have stressed the importance of acquiescence as a separate issue, and
have'insisted on a separate determination of it where there is any conflict in the evidence.
Felton v. Aubrey, 74 Fed. 350 (6th Cir. 1896); Jensen v. Utah Ry., 72 Utah 366, 270
Pac. 349 (1927); Smalley v. Rio Grande W.R.R., 34 Utah 423, 98 Pac. 311 (1908);
Davis v. Chicago & N.W.R.R., 58 Wisc. 646, 17 N.W. 406 (1883).
220. See, e.g., the holdings and the language in cases cited note 219 supra; sources
cited notes 215-16 supra; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 334 (1934).
221. "[A] developing law of negligence has battered continually at the gates guard-
ing the immunities of possessors of land. Compromise after compromise has been effected
between the social value of human life and the social value of the unrestricted use of
land. The last chapter is not yet written .... In studying the cases the trouble too fre-
quently is in the difference between what the courts say and what they decide. Too often
the terminology is still in eighteenth or nineteenth century phrasing. Too often the tres-
passer is dubbed something else to permit a recovery not countenanced by the outgrown
rule." Eldredge, supra note 216, at 34.
222. In the following cases, unsuccessful efforts to stop trespassing did not avoid
defendant's duty of care towards frequent trespassers. Great No. Ry. v. Thompson, 199
Fed. 395 (9th Cir. 1912); Southern R.R. v. Jones, 172 Ky. 8, 188 S.W. 873 (1916);
Doyle v. Portland R.L. & P. Co., 71 Ore. 576, 143 Pac. 623 (1914) ; Teakle v. San Pedro,
L.A. & S.L.R.R., 32 Utah 276, 90 Pac. 402 (1907); Brophy v. Milwaukee Electric Ry.
& Transport Co., 251 Wisc. 558, 30 N.W.2d 76 (1947). Cf. RESTAT=MENT, TORTS § 334,
comment d (1934) ("no trespassing" signs are inadequate if defendant should know that
they are in fact disregarded).
223. See sources cited note 216 supra. If courts were really looking for the land-
owner's consent, they would be hesitant to imply it in cases where he simply does nothing
to stop trespassing, since this is more apt to indicate the reluctant acceptance of an
irremediable, but decidedly unwanted, situation than to show consent. And this is true
whether consent be taken to refer to the occupier's state of mind or to conduct that leads
others reasonably to conclude that he consents to their 'presence. See Bohlen, supra note
215, at 248; Eldredge, supra note 216, at 35; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 330, comment b
(1934).
Of course, in any given case, defendant's acquiescence might point to an inference of
consent. See Ehly v. Philadelphia & R.R.R., 56 Pa. Super. 512 (1914) (a railroad, in
fencing its property, leaves an opening where the public had beaten a path across the
tracks).
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